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TO THINE OWN CEO BE TRUE: TAILORING
CEO COMPENSATION TO INDIVIDUAL
PERSONALITY AND CIRCUMSTANCES
William O. Fisher∗
Eight-figure compensation. Cash. Restricted stock.
Options. Performance shares. And more. Companies shower
their CEOs with pay in large amounts, delivered in multiple
ways, and dependent on complex and intricate formulae. It is
all intended to motivate the top officers to make decisions that
will best benefit their companies. Common sense tells us that
the value of a complicated, multifaceted pay package—and
hence its ability to motivate—will depend on the
psychological characteristics and financial circumstances of
the particular executive being paid. Economic theory and
empirical studies confirm this intuition. Yet, companies
generally ignore these vital factors. Substantive and
disclosure law should push them to take these key variables
into account.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Today’s public companies1 provide prodigious pay
packages to their chief executive officers (“CEOs”). These
companies pay in multiple, complicated ways. Not only do
1 A “public company,” for purposes of this Article, is one that has
registered a security on a national securities exchange (such as the New
York Stock Exchange or Nasdaq) under section 12(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act or has registered a class of equity securities under section
12(g) because its assets and shareholder base meet or exceed the section
12(g) floor. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(b) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (2012).
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they use salaries, but also cash bonuses and a wide variety of
equity vehicles—stock options, service-based restricted stock,
and performance shares. The values of the options, restricted
stock, and performance shares depend on the market price of
the company’s stock in the future. The number of
performance shares and the amounts of cash bonuses depend
on multiple measures of company performance, weighted and
bounded in complicated equations.
All of it is designed to motivate the top officers to make
decisions that strike the right balance between caution and
audacity, protection of existing company value and growth,
and safety and risk. The multiple participants in the paysetting process, and the experts they hire, earnestly seek this
goal.
But no one focuses on the individual CEO they are trying
to motivate: companies rarely consider the personality and
financial condition of the CEO. This defies intuition, human
experience, decades of economic thought, and volumes of
studies. As a result, compensation is cumbersome, wasteful,
and only matches well with the characteristics and
circumstances of individual CEOs by luck. There must be a
better way, and law can play a part in moving companies
toward it.
This Article collects the theory and empirical evidence
showing the connection between such individual traits as
risk aversion and reaction to complex incentive schemes, on
the one hand, and the value of compensation to different
individuals, on the other hand. It then shows how the law
can encourage use of that connection to improve CEO pay.
Part II describes current top-officer compensation,
particularly its complexity and the reasons for that
complexity. Part III shows that companies do not design
complex pay packages with the personality and financial
circumstances of the CEO in mind, even though the
individual personality and finances of a CEO are key factors
affecting motivation. Part III then demonstrates that failure
to individually tailor compensation fails to maximize
incentive effects. Part IV proposes state and federal law
reforms to push companies toward bringing the pay systems
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and the individual characteristics together. The reforms
permit experimentation, avoid regimentation, recognize that
constructive change will take time, and, although giving all
public companies a push, allow each to make substantive
adjustments at its own pace.

II. CEO PAY TODAY
This Part begins by demonstrating that CEO
compensation is complex and public companies consider it
important. This Part next sets out the principal components
of CEO pay packages, using CEO pay at a railroad, Norfolk
Southern Corp. (“NSC”),2 as a case study. To show that
NSC’s pay scheme is not an aberration, this Part describes
the CEO pay packages at four very different companies:
computer chip manufacturer Intel;3 integrated oil and gas
company Chevron;4 healthcare product and pharmaceutical
manufacturer Johnson & Johnson (“J&J”);5 and financial
industry giant JPMorgan Chase (“JPM”) (collectively with
NSC the “Exemplar Companies”).6 By a summary of studies,
this Part then documents that the complicated pay practices
of these Exemplar Companies represent the norm. This Part
concludes by arguing that these elaborate pay schemes,
considered in the abstract, are rational in the sense that they
are designed to motivate CEOs to pursue multiple objectives,
to promote both short-term and long-term economic success,
and to balance risk and caution in order to increase, rather
than erode, company value.

2 NSC, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 11, 2015) [hereinafter NSC
2015 10-K].
3 Intel Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 13, 2015) [hereinafter
Intel 2015 10-K].
4 Chevron Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 20, 2015)
[hereinafter Chevron 2015 10-K].
5 J&J, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 24, 2015) [hereinafter J&J
2015 10-K].
6 JPM, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 24, 2015) [hereinafter JPM
2015 10-K].
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A. The Intricacy and Importance of CEO Pay
Companies describe their executive pay in proxy
statements per federal regulations.7 These regulations
require a company to disclose compensation to the principal
executive officer (usually the CEO), the principal financial
officer, and the three other most highly compensated
executive officers (collectively the “named executive officers”
or “NEOs”).8 Companies pay particular attention to
explaining the compensation paid to the CEO. An
examination of the length of these disclosures, and a
comparison of that length to the length of disclosures
describing company financial performance, proves revealing.
Table 1 shows the number of pages that each of the
Exemplar Companies devoted in its 2015 proxy statement to
2014 compensation for its NEOs. Table 1 also compares the
length of that disclosure with the aggregate number of pages
that each company allocated—in its Form 10-K annual
report for the 2014 year—to Risk Factors,9 Management’s
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results
of
Operations,10
and
Financial
Statements
and
11
Supplementary Data.

17 C.F.R. § 229.402(a)(2) & (3) (2017).
Id.
9 Form 10-K, Item 1A requires companies to discuss Risk Factors,
defined as “the most significant factors that make [investment in the
company] speculative or risky.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2017); see SEC,
FORM 10-K ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 8 (2012),
https://www.sec.gov/files/form10-k.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TB5M-YKXT]
[hereinafter 10-K GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS].
10 Form 10-K, Item 7 requires companies to provide Management’s
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations,
with 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 setting out the details of the disclosure. See 17
C.F.R. § 229.303 (2017); 10-K, supra note 9, at 9. The Commission has said
that Management Discussion and Analysis (“MD&A”) “is intended to give
the investor an opportunity to look at the company through the eyes of
management by providing both a short and long-term analysis of the
business of the company.” Concept Release on Management’s Discussion
7
8
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TABLE 1.

Company

Pages in Proxy
Statement
Describing
NEO
Compensation

NSC

3812

Pages in Annual
Report Providing
MD&A, Risk
Factors, and
Financial
Statements &
Supplementary Data
6113

Intel

2814

9315

30%

J&J

4316

6717

64%

Chevron

3018

7419

41%

JPM

3420

25421

13%

Executive
Compensation
Pages as % of
Pages Describing
Key Business Risks
& Results
62%

Table 1 shows that each Exemplar Company used more
than two dozen pages to explain its compensation program
and Analysis of Financial Condition and Operations, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,715,
13,717 (Apr. 24, 1987).
11 Form 10-K, Item 8 requires companies to include financial
statements and other financial schedules as set out in Regulation S-X,
which in turn requires (among other things) that companies include in
their 10-Ks audited balance sheets for the year just ended and the year
before, as well as audited income statements and cash flow statements for
the year just ended and the preceding two years. 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.3-01(a),
-02(a) (2017).
12 NSC, Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 45–82 (Mar. 25, 2015)
[hereinafter NSC 2015 Proxy Statement].
13 NSC 2015 10-K, supra note 2, at K13–K16, K21–K35, K36–K77.
14 Intel, Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 37–64 (Apr. 2, 2015)
[hereinafter Intel 2015 Proxy Statement].
15 Intel 2015 10-K, supra note 3, at 18–25, 31–50, 52–116.
16 J&J, Notice of Annual Meeting and Proxy Statement (Form DEF
14A) 29–71 (Mar. 11, 2015) [hereinafter J&J 2015 Proxy Statement].
17 J&J 2015 10-K, supra note 5, Ex. 13 at 1–67.
18 Chevron, Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 28–57 (Apr. 9, 2015)
[hereinafter Chevron 2015 Proxy Statement].
19 Chevron 2015 10-K, supra note 4, at 22–24, FS1–FS71.
20 JPM, Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 32–65 (Apr. 8, 2015)
[hereinafter JPM 2015 Proxy Statement].
21 JPM 2015 10-K, supra note 6 at 8–17, 64–169, 171–308.
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for top officers. These absolute numbers reflect the extreme
complexity of executive pay. As a benchmark, investors
believe that a complete proxy statement—addressing not only
executive pay but also all other matters that come before the
shareholders at annual meetings22—should ideally run to
only about twenty-five pages.23 Thus, the pay structures for
each of the five companies were so complicated that their
explication required more pages than investors thought
should be devoted to the entire document.
Table 1 also shows that four of the five Exemplar
Companies devoted to the description of top officer pay 29%
or more of the number of pages that they devoted to the key
information on their entire operations. Two of the companies
devoted more than 60% of the space they allotted to the most

22 For example, listing standards require that shareholders vote on
equity compensation plans. NYSE, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL
§ 303A.08 (2017); NASDAQ, NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULES § 5635(c)
(2017). The Internal Revenue Code also requires that shareholders
approve incentive plans so that the compensation to an executive under
those plans not count toward the $1 million limit on a company’s
deduction of the compensation for any given executive. 26 U.S.C.
§§ 162(m)(1), (m)(4)(C)(ii) (2012). Shareholders have the right not only to
propose resolutions at shareholder meetings, but—subject to certain
important limitations—the right to require that a shareholder-proposed
resolution appear on the proxy card that the company distributes to
shareholders and to require that the company’s proxy statement include
the shareholders’ brief statement supporting the resolutions. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-8 (2017). One count through June 30, 2015 tallied 536
shareholder proposals voted on at the 2015 annual meetings of U.S.
companies in the Russell 3000 index. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2015
PROXY SEASON REVIEW 1 (July 20, 2015).
23 See STANFORD GRADUATE SCH. OF BUS., RR DONNELLY, EQUILAR &
ROCK CTR. FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE, 2015 INVESTOR SURVEY:
DECONSTRUCTING PROXY STATEMENTS—WHAT MATTERS TO INVESTORS
[hereinafter 2015 INVESTOR SURVEY]. The researchers surveyed “64 asset
managers and owners with a combined $17 trillion in assets” in the fall of
2014. Id. at 1. Respondents “report[ed] that the ideal length of a proxy is
25 pages, compared to the actual average of 80 pages among companies in
the Russell 3000.” Id. Funds with more than $100 billion under
management said that the ideal length was thirty-three pages, and funds
managing smaller portfolios identified twenty-one pages as best. Id. at 13.
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important data on business operations. This relative
comparison demonstrates the extreme importance that the
companies—and the SEC, which issued the regulations
prompting this torrent of words—attribute to executive
compensation as a driver of firm success.

B. The Many Parts of a CEO Pay Package
CEOs may receive several different types of
compensation. Although not all companies pay their CEOs in
all of these ways and each element of compensation varies
from company to company, here are typical components:
1. A fixed annual salary;
2. An annual incentive payment, usually in cash, with
the amount of the payment dependent on the extent
to which the company and/or the individual
achieves specified objectives;
3. Equity,24 including one or more of:
a. a stock option grant, which—after the CEO
works through a vesting period—permits the
CEO to buy stock during a set number of years
at a fixed price;
b. a service-based restricted stock grant or
restricted stock units grant, which—after the
CEO continues to work at the company through
a vesting period during which he or she cannot
sell the shares—provides the CEO with fully
tradable stock; and
c. a performance-share grant or performanceshare-units grant, which provides the CEO with
fully tradable shares of stock at the conclusion of
a performance period, with the number of shares

24 Equity includes all payment vehicles that ultimately provide the
executive with shares of his or her company’s common stock or some
amount of money that is expressly equal to the market value of some
number of shares of that stock at a designated time.
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dependent on company financial results during
that time;
4. Credits toward pension payments or other
actuarially defined retirement benefits;
5. Perquisites ranging from use of a corporate airplane
to financial planning; and
6. Plans or agreements that provide economic benefit
to the CEO if he or she retires, is terminated, or the
control of the company changes.25
This Article concentrates on the second and third
components, as companies tend to characterize these as
“incentive compensation”—that is, compensation designed to
affect the decisions that the CEO makes as he or she runs
the company.26

C. How Companies Combine the Components
This subpart demonstrates the current complexity of
executive compensation schemes. First, it describes the
compensation for the Article’s Exemplar Companies,
especially NSC. The subpart then demonstrates that CEO
pay packages at other public companies generally display
similar intricacies.

25 For useful lists and summaries of the different forms of
compensation, see the SEC disclosure rule at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2017).
See also DAVID LARCKER & BRIAN TAYAN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
MATTERS: A CLOSER LOOK AT ORGANIZATIONAL CHOICES AND THEIR
CONSEQUENCES 214–15 (2d ed. 2016) [hereinafter LARCKER & TAYAN,
GOVERNANCE MATTERS]; ROBERT W. KOLB, TOO MUCH IS NOT ENOUGH:
INCENTIVES IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 11–23 (2012) [hereinafter KOLB,
NOT ENOUGH].
26 LARCKER & TAYAN, GOVERNANCE MATTERS, supra note 25, at 229
(“Short-term incentives offer an annual payment (usually cash) for
achieving predetermined performance objectives.”); id. at 232 (“Long-term
incentives are added to the compensation mix to encourage executives to
select long-term investments that increase shareholder value.”); id. at
232–34 (characterizing stock options and other equity as long-term
incentive vehicles).
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NSC—a mundane freight railroad—compensated its top
executive, Charles Moorman, for the year 2014 in multiple
and complex ways.27 NSC paid him cash through an annual
salary and an annual cash incentive payment.28 NSC also
paid him equity through three different vehicles:
performance share units (“PSUs”), stock options, and servicebased restricted stock units (“RSUs”).29
Mr. Moorman’s incentive compensation depended on two
different sets of performance measures, also termed metrics.
Three metrics determined his annual cash incentive
payment, but one of those was subdivided into three
components.30 Consequently, five different measures affected
his annual cash bonus, and each of the five carried a
different weight. Two other metrics determined the number
of shares that he ultimately received from his PSUs—with
one of those measures depending not just on the performance
of his own company, but also the performance of other
railroads or alternatively, if NSC performed poorly by this
comparison, based on NSC’s performance versus S&P 500
companies overall.31
The PSUs and the other two equity vehicles imposed
intertemporal complexity as well. Each PSU award settled
three years after grant and depended on performance over
those three years.32 Each stock-option award that Mr.
Moorman received provided an option that vested after four
years, with a different exercise price for the options granted
in each year because the exercise price for each year’s grant
equaled the price of NSC stock on the date that NSC granted

NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 45–82. Appendix A
sets out CEO Charles Moorman’s 2014 pay package in tabular form.
28 Id. at 54, 62.
29 Id. at 56–59, 62.
30 Id. at 54–56, 62.
31 Id. at 57–59. The S&P 500 “includes 500 leading companies and
captures approximately 80% coverage of available market capitalization.”
S&P DOW JONES INDICES, https://us.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-500
[https:// perma.cc/T7H9-YGKC] (last visited May 22, 2017).
32 NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 57.
27
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the option award.33 Each award of service-based restricted
stock vested after five years.34 Thus, Mr. Moorman was
always in three different performance cycles for his PSUs,
four different vesting cycles (with different exercise prices for
each) for his options, and five different vesting cycles for the
restricted shares. In addition, since he could exercise his
options at any time during a multi-year period after vesting,
he could have at any time vested options that he could
exercise immediately at as many as seven different prices,
with the options terminating on as many as seven different
dates.35
CEO compensation at the other Exemplar Companies
confirms that NSC’s compensation scheme for Mr. Moorman
was not uniquely complex. Appendix B provides the detail,
and a summary follows.
Like NSC, Intel paid its CEO an annual cash incentive
amount and made equity grants to him each year.36 Intel
used three metrics to determine the annual cash incentive
award, with one relating to the goals at ten different
corporate groups (each one of which had, in turn, three to
four internal goals), for a total of thirty-four variables
affecting the cash bonus. Intel made annual equity awards
through two vehicles: PSUs and RSUs.37 The PSUs converted
to a number of common stock shares based on performance
over a three-year period, as determined by a different metric
than those used for the annual cash award—a complicated
formula relating Intel’s total shareholder return (“TSR”)
(dividends plus stock price appreciation) to those of peer
companies.38 Yearly service-based restricted stock grants
vest quarterly over three years.39 The Intel CEO was

33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Id. at 56.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 68.
Intel 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 14, at 42–46, 53.
Id. at 42–44, 57–59.
Id. at 46, 56.
Id. at 46.
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therefore always in three performance cycles and twelve
RSU vesting cycles.
The Chevron CEO’s cash bonus depended on four
different metrics, each assigned a different weight and each
broken down into subparts, with the aggregate subparts
totaling thirteen.40 Chevron made equity-style awards
through two vehicles: performance shares and stock
options.41 Performance shares depended on the company’s
TSR rank among other large oil companies, with
performance measured over three-year cycles.42 But at the
end of the three years, the CEO received cash equal to the
then-current market value of the number of performance
shares earned, instead of the Chevron common stock itself.43
An option award in each year carried an exercise price equal
to the stock price at the time of grant, so that the exercise
price differed from one year’s option award to another year’s
option award.44 The options in any given award vested over
three years—one-third in each year.45 The CEO was always
therefore in three performance-share cycles and three optionvesting cycles.
J&J used three different metrics to determine the annual
cash incentive award, but the 2015 proxy suggested that still
other factors could play a role. The 2015 proxy provided no
insight into how the company weighted the different
variables.46 J&J made annual equity awards through three
vehicles: PSUs, stock options, and RSUs.47 Five measures
determined the number of common shares into which a PSU
award converted at the end of each three-year performance
cycle. An option award each year vested after three years,
with the exercise price for any given award set at the price of
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Chevron 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 18, at 35.
Id. at 38–40.
Id. at 38–40.
Id. at 38, 47 tbl. n.4.
Id. at 38, 47.
Id. at 38.
J&J 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 16, at 32–33, 36, 39.
Id. at 42–43.
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J&J stock at the time of the grant.48 The annual RSU award
vested and converted into J&J common stock at the end of
three years.49 Thus, the CEO was always in three PSU
performance cycles, and three cycles for vesting options and
RSUs.
JPM’s scheme is difficult to parse because its proxy
statement is so vague. But the cash bonus and the number of
RSUs awarded in any given year depended on five factors,
one of which was “performance,” which in turn divided into
four factors, each of which, judging by the examples given,
could be further subdivided.50 In exercising its discretion
within this construct, the compensation committee
considered some unspecified multiyear period.51 An RSU
award—made yearly under this system—vested over three
years, with half of the award vesting after the second year
and half after the third.52
Market-wide surveys show that the great majority of
public companies pay in similarly complicated ways. For
example, one study of 100 large publicly traded U.S.
companies found that in 2014, 67% used three or more
metrics to determine annual bonus payments.53 The same
Id. at 42.
Id. at 43.
50 JPM 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 20, at 38–39, 42.
51 Id. at 38–39, 50.
52 Id. at 50.
53 CLEARBRIDGE COMP. GRP., THE CLEARBRIDGE 100 REPORT: ANNUAL
AND LONG-TERM INCENTIVE DESIGN PRACTICES FOR EXECUTIVES 5 (2015)
[hereinafter CLEARBRIDGE 100 REPORT]. This count may actually
understate the number of metrics, particularly those determining the
annual cash incentive awards, because surveys typically count separately
only the financial metrics that companies employ. When non-financial
measures are included (such as the three incorporated into the composite
service measure that counted towards Mr. Moorman’s annual cash award),
the count can be higher. One survey of 200 large U.S. companies found
that, when non-financial measures were included with financial measures,
52% of the companies used four or more measures to determine short-term
incentive payments and 30% used six or more. JAMES F. REDA ET AL.,
STUDY OF 2013 SHORT- AND LONG-TERM INCENTIVE DESIGN CRITERION
AMONG TOP 200 S&P 500 COMPANIES 16 (2014) [hereinafter REDA,
48
49
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study found that 43% used two long-term incentive vehicles,
and that 33% used three vehicles.54 Forty percent of those
making long-term incentive grants used two metrics to
determine the amount ultimately provided to the top officer,
and another 24% used three or more.55 The study also found
that 85% awarded performance shares or PSUs, with 92% of
those using a three-year performance cycle.56 The majority of
companies vested both stock options and service-based
restricted stock (or RSUs) over three years.57 Of those
companies surveyed, 30% used only a relative measure to
determine long-term incentive awards, while 23% combined
both a relative metric and an absolute measure—that is, one
dependent solely on the performance of the company at
which the executive worked.58
In sum, companies employ multiple metrics to determine
annual and long-term incentives, multiple equity vehicles for
long-term rewards, multiyear cycles for long-term
performance measurement,59 multiyear vesting for options,
INCENTIVE DESIGN]; id. at 4 (study based on “the 2014 annual proxy
statement disclosures for 200 of the top U.S. companies (based on revenue
and market capitalization)”).
54 CLEARBRIDGE 100 REPORT, supra note 53, at 8.
55 Id. at 11.
56 Id. at 10.
57 Id. at 9.
58 Id. at 12 (“Among awards that include a non-stock-based measure
(i.e., a financial/strategic/operating performance measure), the majority
(83%) are measured on an absolute basis only. However, among awards
that use a stock-based measure (e.g., stock price, TSR), performance is
overwhelmingly measured on a relative basis only (88%).”) (emphasis
added).
59 See Ryan Colucci et al., Changing Practices in Executive
Compensation: Annual Incentive Plan Design, CAP FLASH, Jan. 15, 2015,
at 1 (reporting results from a review of proxy statements from 100
companies in the Fortune 500); id. at 3 (“25% of companies disclose using
two (2) metrics in their annual incentive programs, 25% use three (3)
metrics, and 21% of companies use four (4) or more metrics.”); Michael
Biagi et al., Changing Practices in Executive Compensation: Long-Term
Incentive Plan Design, CAP FLASH, Feb. 12, 2015, at 1 [hereinafter CAP
Flash, Long-Term Incentive Design] (reporting results from a review of
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and multiyear vesting for service-based restricted stock.60
Half or more use a relative measure to determine, in whole
or in part, the amount of long-term incentive compensation,

proxy statements from 100 companies in the Fortune 500); id. at 2
(“Companies continue to use multiple vehicles to deliver LTI to executives.
51% of companies in our study deliver LTI in the form of two vehicles, 29%
use three vehicles and 20% use only one vehicle. . . . In our study, most
companies with performance-based LTI plans use two metrics.”); EQUILAR,
INC., PERFORMANCE METRICS IN ANNUAL INCENTIVE PLANS 1, 3 (2014)
(analyzing random sample of 50 companies from the S&P 500 filing proxy
statements between January 1 and April 20, 2013 and finding 31
companies using two or more financial or market-based metrics, with 27
using two or three); EQUILAR, INC., MEASURING LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE:
AN ANALYSIS OF S&P 500 EQUITY INCENTIVE PLAN METRICS 1 (2014)
[hereinafter
EQUILAR,
MEASURING
LONG-TERM
PERFORMANCE]
(“[E]xamin[ing] the long-term (performance period greater than one year)
performance-based equity granted to CEOs in the S&P 500 over the past
three years . . . ” and providing graph showing that a bit over 60% of the
companies used two or more metrics for long-term incentive
compensation); MERIDIAN COMP. PARTNERS, LLC, 2013 TRENDS AND
DEVELOPMENTS IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 4 (2013) [hereinafter
MERIDIAN, 2013 TRENDS IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION] (reporting survey
responses from 136 companies); id. at 13 (stating that a “strong majority of
responding companies (76%) continue to utilize two or more performance
metrics,” with graph showing 29% using three metrics and 4% using four
or more); id. at 20 (stating that “[e]ighty-five percent (85%) of respondents
are actively using 2 or 3 LTI vehicles in 2013 for senior executives” and
providing a table showing that the most popular vehicles are stock options
or stock appreciation rights, performance shares or PSUs, and timevesting restricted stock or RSUs); id. at 22 (“The great majority of longterm performance plans use a 3-year performance period (87%). . . .”).
60 REDA, INCENTIVE DESIGN, supra note 53, at 23. Stock options vested
“[t]ypically over three years (56%) or four years (34%) with a ten-year term
(86%) or seven-year term (11%),” with restricted stock or RSUs vesting
“[t]ypically over the three years (67%) or four years (23%),” and 71% of
performance-based awards vesting at the end of a three-year performance
period. Id. The study also reported that 72% of the companies used two or
more measures for long-term incentive compensation, with 32% using
three or more. Id. at 16. As to the set of vehicles used as long-term
incentives, “[t]he most common combinations are a mix of stock options
and performance-based awards (34%) followed by a blend of stock options,
time-vested stock, and performance-based awards (29%).” Id. at 21, 22.
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with a TSR comparison of the executive’s company to that of
other companies most popular.61

D. What Companies Are Trying to Do
Companies design these elaborate compensation schemes
to motivate their top officers to make decisions that will
benefit the companies. Each company wants to focus its
executives on those aspects of the firm’s business, and its
financial results, central to short-term success. Nonetheless,
companies also want their CEO to focus on long-term
financial performance and to align their CEO’s interests with
those of the company’s shareholders.
Thus, Mr. Moorman’s annual cash incentive payment for
2014 depended on (i) NSC’s operating income for the year
(railway operating revenues minus railway operating
expenses (e.g., compensation, fuel, and depreciation)); (ii)
NSC’s operating ratio for the year (essentially the cost, in
operating expenses, to generate a dollar in operating
revenue); and (iii) a composite service measure (broken down
into (a) adherence to operating plan, (b) connection

61 EQUILAR, MEASURING LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE, supra note 59, at 2
(“Relative TSR continues to be the most popular long-term performance
metric, appearing in 57.7% of 2013 plans . . . .”); CAP Flash, Long-Term
Incentive Design, supra note 59, at 3 (“Overall, 49% of companies in our
study measure performance relative to the external market (typically
using TSR) . . . . Approximately 92% of companies that use TSR, measure
performance relative to a defined comparator group (54% use a defined
peer group, 40% use a broader industry index and 6% use both) . . . .”);
MERIDIAN, 2013 TRENDS IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 59, at 23
(“Sixty-four percent (64%) of performance plans use a relative performance
metric in 2013, up from 49% in 2012. For those companies, relative
performance metrics are weighted 79% on average for the performance
plan. Also, of such plans, approximately 82% use TSR performance
relative to a peer group or index.”); REDA, INCENTIVE DESIGN, supra note
53, at 17 (“Of the 185 companies with LTIPs, 61% used at least one
relative measure in their 2013 LTIP design, slightly higher than last
year’s 59%. . . . Eighty-one percent (81%) of these companies used TSR as
the relative measure in 2013 . . . .”).
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performance, and (c) train performance).62 Roughly, the
company provided a cash incentive for making a profit,
getting the most out of each dollar spent in making that
profit, and running the trains well.
To stretch his horizon out beyond one year, NSC awarded
Mr. Moorman PSUs with a three-year performance cycle and
the number of shares he would ultimately receive at the end
of the cycle depending on (i) the three-year average of aftertax return on average invested capital and (ii) NSC’s TSR
versus the TSR of comparable railroads, or alternatively, if
NSC fared poorly against the other railroads, the TSR for the
S&P 500 companies.63 Roughly, the PSU grants provided an
equity incentive for getting the most profit out of the money
put into the company and providing a return to shareholders
better than the return they could earn by investing their
money in other railroads; or if not, at least a greater return
than if they invested in a diversified portfolio of other large
American businesses.
Thus, the logic of the several incentives was internally
consistent. And the multiple metrics determining Mr.
Moorman’s rewards arguably reflected several different ways
of thinking about NSC’s success. Moreover, the many metrics
might have prevented him from fixating on one alone, to the
detriment of others that were also important.64

62

NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 54–56.
Id. at 57–59.
64 See CAROL BOWIE ET AL., ISS, EVALUATING PAY FOR PERFORMANCE
ALIGNMENT 15 (2014) [hereinafter ISS PAY/PERFORMANCE ALIGNMENT]
(“Use of a single metric, or very similar metrics, in either or both of the
short- and long-term incentive programs may suggest inappropriate focus
on one aspect of business results at the expense of others.”); GLASS LEWIS
& CO., PROXY PAPER GUIDELINES: 2015 PROXY SEASON, AN ANALYSIS OF THE
GLASS LEWIS APPROACH TO PROXY ADVICE UNITED STATES 28 (2015)
[hereinafter GLASS LEWIS 2015 GUIDELINES] (stating that Glass Lewis uses
“five performance metrics” in its own computations to determine the
alignment of executive pay with company performance); id. at 29
(reporting Glass Lewis’s belief that a “well-structured” long-term incentive
plan should have “[t]wo or more performance metrics” and adding: “While
cognizant of the inherent complexity of certain performance metrics, Glass
63
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Using a mix of both service-based restricted stock and
stock options made sense too. Theoreticians suggest that
such a mix can subtly adjust the differing incentives that
each vehicle provides in order to strike an optimum balance.
Thus, stock options reward executives for taking risks to
increase stock price.65 Service-based restricted stock
encourages more cautious decisions that preserve a stock’s
existing value.66 The proper mix of options and restricted
stock might, in theory, lead the top executive to make
decisions that are usefully aggressive but still appropriately
cautious.67 Companies seem to attempt this balance.68

Lewis generally believes that measuring a company’s performance with
multiple metrics serves to provide a more complete picture of the
company’s performance than a single metric; further, reliance on just one
metric may focus too much management attention on a single target and is
therefore more susceptible to manipulation”).
65 A stock option is the right, but not the obligation, to purchase stock
at the exercise price after the option vests but before it expires. The
exercise price is almost always the price of the stock on the date of the
option grant. Thus, the executive granted an option at the time that his or
her company’s stock price is $X/share has an incentive to take on risk in
order to increase the price of the company’s stock above $X/share after the
option vests but before the option expires. If the risk produces that result,
the executive makes money by exercising the option for $X and selling the
stock into the market for its price above $X. On the other hand, if the risk
reduces the price of the stock below $X, the executive has not lost any
money because he or she simply does not exercise the option at all.
66 Restricted stock converts to common stock after vesting—
regardless of the price of the common stock at that time and without the
executive paying the company for the removal of the restrictions. Thus, if
the price of the stock is $X at the time of grant and the executive causes
the company to take on risk that lowers the price, the executive suffers a
real loss in the value of the restricted stock.
67 See KOLB, NOT ENOUGH, supra note 25, at 87 (“[E]conomic theory
finds . . . that holdings of [stock options] generally increase the CEO’s
willingness to take risk, and that very large holdings of restricted stock
can lead executives to be unwilling to take risks.”); id. at 105 (“The firm
needs to set an executive pay package that incentivizes risk-taking in the
right amount and in the right way. . . . Ideally, the right mix of [stock
options] and restricted stock in a pay package can provide the right
incentives . . . .”).
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Finally, all of the equity components of his
compensation—the stock options, the service-based
restricted stock, and the performance shares—aligned Mr.
Moorman’s interests with those of the other NSC
shareholders. That is, since the ultimate value of each of
these vehicles depended on the price of NSC’s stock, each one
motivated him to take actions that would increase the price
of that stock.69 Such a stock price increase would not only
benefit Mr. Moorman, but all other NSC shareholders as
well. Research supports the notion that such an alignment
works. Studies find a positive association between significant
top executive ownership of company stock and company
financial performance.70
The seeming rationality of the current system rests,
however, on abstract design. Nothing in the description just
68 Id. at 106 (“These reflections on the incentive effects of stock
holdings and [stock options] are broadly consistent with the executive pay
packages observed across the corporate landscape. They almost all utilize
a mix of both restricted stock and [stock options] as incentivizing and
restraining elements in the CEO’s pay package.”).
69 LARCKER & TAYAN, GOVERNANCE MATTERS, supra note 25, at 247
(“In theory, executives who hold equity in the companies they manage—
either directly in the form of stock ownership or indirectly through options,
restricted stock, or performance shares—have greater incentive to improve
the economic value of the firm.”).
70 For example, two researchers studied the effect of CEO stock
ownership on abnormal stock returns, using data on publicly traded
companies covering the period January 1988 to June 2010. Ulf Von
Lilienfeld-Toal & Stefan Ruenzi, CEO Ownership, Stock Market
Performance, and Managerial Discretion, 69 J. FIN. 1013, 1022 (2014). The
researchers defined CEO ownership in two different ways, in one of which
they computed the percentage of total outstanding common stock held by
the CEO, then ranked firms, top to bottom, by that percentage. Id. at
1021. After controlling for other factors, they found that even firms in the
mid-60s percentiles of that ranking outperformed firms with low CEO
ownership to an economically significant extent and by results that were
statistically significant. Id. at 1026–28 & tbl.III. See also LARCKER &
TAYAN, GOVERNANCE MATTERS, supra note 25, at 249 (summarizing other
studies and concluding that “[r]esearch generally supports the notion that
equity ownership [by executives] is positively associated with firm
performance”).
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given says anything about the individual to be motivated—
Mr. Moorman’s personal risk tolerance, his current financial
condition, or the extent to which his wealth was already
concentrated in NSC stock. Instead, the description suggests
that the pay package at NSC was designed to motivate
whoever occupied the CEO post to make the same decisions
that would bring short- and long-term prosperity to the
railroad and its owners. This over-concentration on design
and under-concentration on the individual is a central error,
as the next Part shows.

III. WHY CURRENT CEO PAY IS FUNDAMENTALLY
IRRATIONAL
This Part demonstrates that current elaborate pay
schemes do not take account of the characteristics and
financial circumstances of individual CEOs. The Part then
shows that those characteristics and circumstances are
vitally important to determining whether a company’s
compensation arrangements in fact motivate a particular
CEO or not.

A. Failure to Take Account of Individual CEO
Personalities and Circumstances
Federal regulations require that each company include in
its Compensation Disclosure and Analysis (“CD&A”) “[w]hy
[it] chooses to pay each [type of compensation],” “[h]ow [the
company] determines the amount” of each type of
compensation, “the basis for allocating [long-term]
compensation to each different type of award,” and “[t]he
factors considered in decisions to increase or decrease
compensation materially.”71 Accordingly, if a company is
selecting a type of compensation or determining the amount
of compensation on the basis of a CEO’s individual
characteristics or circumstances, the law requires that the

71

(2017).

17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b)(1)(iv), (v) (2017); id. §229.402(b)(2)(iii), (ix)
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company disclose that fact. No CD&A of any Exemplar
Company stated that the firm considered, when designing or
setting its CEO compensation, any aspect of its top
executive’s personality or any aspect of his or her current
financial condition.72 It is therefore fair to conclude that none
of them did.
Two sets of experts typically affect top officer pay. The
companies hire one set, called compensation consultants.
The shareholders hire another, called proxy advisers.
The board of directors, with the compensation committee
of the board playing a key role in the process, set the CEO
pay at each of the Exemplar Companies.73 Stock exchange
listing standards require that boards and their compensation
72 See NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 45–61; Intel 2015
Proxy Statement, supra note 14, at 37–51; J&J 2015 Proxy Statement,
supra note 16, at 30–53; Chevron 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 18, at
24–43; JPM 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 20, at 32–57. There are
some exceptions outside the exemplars. Netflix effectively lets executives
express their individual natures by permitting each one of them,
individually, to allocate his or her total compensation figure between cash,
stock options, and performance-based bonuses. Netflix, Inc., Proxy
Statement (Form DEF 14A) 29 (Apr. 27, 2016); see also DAVID LARCKER &
BRIAN TAYAN, A REAL LOOK AT REAL WORLD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 141–
43 (2013) (“The Netflix approach to compensation is highly unique and
intended to solve traditional problems relating to the economic efficiency
and incentive value of compensation.”).
73 NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 41 (duties of the
Compensation Committee include “considering and recommending to the
independent members of the Board the compensation of the chief executive
officer”); Intel 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 14, at 22 (“The
Compensation Committee is responsible for determining compensation for
Intel executives (including our CEO and our Chairman) . . . .”); J&J 2015
Proxy Statement, supra note 16, at 12 (“The Compensation & Benefits
Committee is responsible for . . . reviewing and recommending for approval
by the independent Directors of the Board, the compensation for our Chief
Executive Officer . . . .”); Chevron 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 18, at
17 (the Management Compensation Committee “[r]eviews and
recommends to the independent Directors the salary and other
compensation for the CEO”); JPM 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 20, at
44 (“Based on [CEO] Dimon’s 2014 performance, the [Compensation &
Management Development Committee] awarded Mr. Dimon total annual
compensation of $20 million . . . .”).
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committees play this key role.74 But the compensation
committees at four of the five Exemplar Companies hired an
outside compensation consultant to help the board set the
pay,75 as both federal law and stock exchange listing
standards anticipate but do not demand.76 The 80% of
74 E.g., NYSE, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.05(b)(i)(A)
(2017) (requiring that the compensation committee have a written charter
that sets out its responsibilities, one of which is to: “[R]eview and approve
corporate goals and objectives relevant to CEO compensation, evaluate the
CEO’s performance in light of those goals and objectives, and, either as a
committee or together with the other independent directors (as directed by
the board), determine and approve the CEO’s compensation level based on
this evaluation”); NASDAQ, NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULES § 5605 (d)(2)
(2017) (requiring each listed company to have a compensation committee);
id. at (d)(1) (requiring that the committee have a written charter and that
the charter state “the compensation committee’s responsibility for
determining, or recommending to the board for determination, the
compensation of the chief executive officer”).
75 NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 16 (reporting that
the company “designed our executive compensation program with advice
from its compensation consultant”); id. at 42 (“In setting such
compensation for the directors and the chief executive officer, the
Compensation Committee considers the recommendations of the
compensation consultant.”); Intel 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 14, at
22 (reporting that the “Compensation Committee retains an independent
executive compensation consultant, Farient Advisors LLC, to provide
input, analysis, and advice about Intel’s executive compensation
philosophy, peer groups, pay positioning (by pay component and in total),
compensation design, equity usage and allocation, and risk assessment
under Intel’s compensation programs”); Chevron 2015 Proxy Statement,
supra note 18, at 42 (reporting that its “[Management Compensation
Committee] retains an independent compensation consultant—Meridian
Compensation Partners LLC—to assist it with its duties”); J&J 2015
Proxy Statement, supra note 16, at 12 (“The Compensation & Benefits
Committee has retained Frederic W. Cook & Co., Inc. (FWC) as its
independent compensation consultant for matters related to executive
officer and Non-Employee Director compensation.”).
76 Recognizing the widespread use of compensation consultants, law,
regulation, and listing standards provide that compensation committees
must have authority to hire them, and if a consultant is hired, that
committee must control the selection and evaluation of the consultant and
oversee its work. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3(e) (2012), with implementing
regulation at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10C-1(b)(3) (2017) and complementary listing
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Exemplar Companies retaining compensation consultants
almost exactly mirrors the percentage of all large public
companies using such consultants.77
Federal regulations require that companies describe the
role that compensation consultants play.78 None of the four
Exemplar
Companies
that
reported
employing
a
compensation consultant described the consultant’s tasks as
including an evaluation of the personality of the company’s
CEO.79 None of them reported asking the consultant to
collect and summarize information on the CEO’s personal
financial circumstances.80 None of them reported seeking
advice from the consultant about tailoring compensation to
the CEO’s wealth or aversion to risk in personal financial
affairs or the CEO’s reaction to complexity in
compensation.81
Shareholders at each public company express their views
on compensation by voting for or against “say-on-pay”
resolutions (“SOPRs”), by which companies ask owners for
approval of the pay to their NEOs.82 Even though the votes
standards at NYSE, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.05(c)(iii)
(2017) and NASDAQ, NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULES § 5605(d)(3)(C) (2017).
77 NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS, 2015–2016 NACD PUBLIC COMPANY
GOVERNANCE SURVEY 4 (2015) (report compiled from 1034 public company
responses, supplemented by data compiled by Equilar, a company that
collects and organizes executive compensation information); id. at 17 (the
boards at 79% of companies with capitalization of $10 billion or more—and
from which responses to this question were obtained—reported receiving a
presentation from a compensation consultant).
78 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(e)(3)(iii) (2017).
79 See NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 47–48; Intel 2015
Proxy Statement, supra note 14, at 22; Chevron 2015 Proxy Statement,
supra note 18, at 42; J&J 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 16, at 48.
80 See NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 47–48; Intel 2015
Proxy Statement, supra note 14, at 22; Chevron 2015 Proxy Statement,
supra note 18, at 42; J&J 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 16, at 48.
81 See NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 47–48; Intel 2015
Proxy Statement, supra note 14, at 22; Chevron 2015 Proxy Statement,
supra note 18, at 42; J&J 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 16, at 48.
82 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a) (2012), with implementing regulations at 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b)(3), § 240.14a-21 (2017).
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are non-binding, companies pay attention to the results, and
a company may change its executive compensation
arrangements when the percentage of shares voted in favor
of its SOPR falls below 70%.83 Proxy advisory firms influence
the votes of many institutional investors on these
resolutions.84 Since companies know this to be so, many of
them attempt to design their pay schemes so that proxy
advisers will support their SOPRs.85

83 A study of 2011 votes on say-on-pay found that 55% of the
companies whose resolutions garnered an ISS negative recommendation
that year made changes in their compensation plans the next year in
response to the vote, with the responsiveness well correlated to whether
the percentage of shares voted against the resolution exceeded the 30%
level identified by ISS as the level that should trigger particular concern.
Yonca Ertimur et al., Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors: Evidence
from Say on Pay, 51 J. ACCT. RES. 951, 984–86 (2013).
84 A study of votes in 2011 on say-on-pay resolutions found a negative
Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) recommendation associated
with an almost 25% increase in “no” votes and a negative recommendation
by both ISS and Glass Lewis associated with a more than 38% increase in
“no” votes. Id. at 951, 953. The study analyzed votes at 1275 firms in the
S&P 1500, id. at 953, and controlled for the percentage of shares held by
blockholders (i.e., owners with more than 5% of outstanding shares), as
well as abnormal returns, CEO total pay, growth in CEO pay, and total
percentage of institutional shareholding, id. at 975–77.
85 A survey of 110 companies in late 2011 found that 70% of
“compensation programs were influenced by the guidance received from
proxy advisory firms or by the policies of those firms.” David F. Larcker et
al., The Conference Bd., The Influence of Proxy Advisory Firm Voting
Recommendations on Say-on-Pay Votes and Executive Compensation
Decisions, DIRECTOR NOTES FROM THE CONFERENCE BOARD, Mar. 2012, at 3,
4. And many companies regularly themselves, or with the help of outside
consultants, run their top executive compensation through models
simulating the models that the major proxy advisors employ to help
determine whether to recommend a vote for or against a company’s SOPR.
MERIDIAN, 2013 TRENDS IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 59, at 9
(“In 2013, the majority of respondents (73%) replicated ISS’s quantitative
Pay-for-Performance tests in order to prepare for ISS’s evaluation.”).
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The two most powerful proxy advisory firms are ISS and
Glass Lewis.86 Both employ a long and complex analysis to
determine whether to recommend voting for or against each
public company’s SOPR.87 Both base their recommendations
significantly on ratios and equations.88 Both hunt for specific
contract provisions that the proxy advisor deems
questionable.89 Both set out preferred compensation

86 ISS clients manage $25 trillion in assets and Glass Lewis clients
manage $15 trillion. LARCKER & TAYAN, GOVERNANCE MATTERS, supra note
25, at 364.
87 See ISS, 2015 U.S. COMPENSATION POLICIES: FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS 14–33 (2015) [hereinafter ISS 2015 FAQ COMPENSATION]; ISS
PAY/PERFORMANCE ALIGNMENT, supra note 64; GLASS LEWIS 2015
GUIDELINES, supra note 64.
88 In 2015, ISS used a model with three screens: (i) “Relative Degree
of Alignment,” which “compare[d] the percentile ranks of a company’s CEO
pay and [total shareholder return] performance, relative to an industryand-size derived comparison group, annualized for the prior three fiscal
year periods”; (ii) “Multiple of Median,” which “expresse[d] the prior year’s
CEO pay as a multiple of the median pay of its comparison group for the
same period”; and (iii) “Pay-TSR Alignment,” which was an “absolute
measure compar[ing] the trends of the CEO’s annual pay and the value of
an investment in the company over the prior five-year period.” ISS 2015
FAQ COMPENSATION, supra note 87, at 15. Glass Lewis’ “model
benchmark[ed] . . . executives’ pay and company performance against
peers selected using Equilar’s market-based peer groups and across five
performance metrics. By measuring the magnitude of the gap between two
weighted-average percentile rankings (executive compensation and
performance), [Glass Lewis] grade[d] companies based on a school letter
system: ‘A,’ ‘B,’ ‘F,’ etc.” GLASS LEWIS 2015 GUIDELINES, supra note 64, at
28.
89 ISS looked for such pay arrangements as “[c]ontracts containing
multi-year guarantees for salary increases, non-performance based
bonuses, or equity compensation,” “[i]nclusion of performance-based equity
or other long-term awards in the pension calculation,” “[c]hange in control
cash payments exceeding 3 times base salary plus target/average/last paid
bonus,” and “[d]ividends or dividend equivalents paid on unvested
performance shares or units.” ISS 2015 FAQ COMPENSATION, supra note
87, at 29–30. Glass Lewis looked for such “problematic contractual
payments, . . . as guaranteed bonuses,” GLASS LEWIS 2015 GUIDELINES,
supra note 64, at 27, and “egregious pay practices” like “large one-off
payments [or] the inappropriate, unjustified use of discretion.” Id. at 28.
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practices, some quite prescriptive.90 But neither the ISS nor
Glass Lewis analysis says a word about the personalities or
financial circumstances of individual CEOs.
In sum, while each company creates its own
compensation package for its CEO and while the packages,
though sharing complexity, are each somewhat different, the
companies do not tailor compensation to the psychological
traits and financial circumstances of their top executives.
The companies do not ask the experts they hire to so tailor
that compensation. The experts advising the shareholders do
not evaluate CEO compensation to determine whether the
pay package fits the individual.

B. Why the Failure Renders CEO Compensation
Irrational
Motivation is inherently individual. Intuitively, we sense
that what motivates one person effectively may not motivate
another, or may motivate him or her but poorly. Gut instinct
counsels that designing a scheme to motivate a man or
woman without taking into account that individual’s
personality and financial circumstances is unlikely to yield
optimal results.
Theorists have thought about executive compensation,
and researchers have studied it, for decades. While their
models and findings support different design features of
modern CEO pay, this Article concentrates on the virtual
consensus that whether a given kind or amount of
compensation motivates well or not depends critically on the
characteristics and financial condition of the individual
executive who receives the pay.
This subpart shows, first, that different executives react
differently to pay complexity. It demonstrates, second, that
90 See supra note 64 (noting ISS opposition to use of a single metric in
either short-term or long-term incentive formulae). Glass Lewis favored,
for short-term incentives, “a mix of corporate and individual performance
measures” and, for long-term incentives “[p]erformance periods of at least
three years” and “[t]wo or more performance metrics.” GLASS LEWIS 2015
GUIDELINES, supra note 64, at 28–29.
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the value of contingent equity varies according to an
individual executive’s personal financial risk aversion and
the proportion of his or her wealth already comprised of
company equity. It argues, third, that the amount of
company equity an executive owns profoundly affects
whether an additional grant of contingent equity increases
the alignment of the executive’s interests with those of other
shareholders. Finally, the subpart observes that an
individual executive’s total wealth may have a profound
impact on whether the financial incentives available to a
company can motivate the executive at all.

1. Individual Response to Complexity in
Compensation
The complexity of modern CEO compensation described
in Part II can produce at least two problems. First,
complexity can so degrade the executive’s confidence in the
connection between his or her decisions and the pay he or
she receives that the complexity itself reduces both the value
that the executive attributes to the pay package and
motivation that the package provides. Second, laundry lists
of metrics can load a pay package with a dozen or more
variables, each of which will affect a CEO’s pay very slightly,
and may distract the executive rather than incentivize. In
each case, the personality of the executive determines
whether the complexity works to the paying company’s
advantage or disadvantage.

a. Complexity and Executive Confidence in the
Connection Between Decisions and Pay
Results
Behavioral theory concentrates on an officer’s “perception
of the (subjectively calculated) value of an incentive award,”
which “will typically be less than the award’s (objectively
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calculated) economic value”91 “for reasons of economic
psychology . . . rather than rational choice.”92 Behaviorists
posit that the worth of an incentive payment to the executive
depends on that particular executive’s beliefs about a series
of connections: CEO action → company performance →
incentive reward → value of that reward.93 Whether an
incentive motivates depends on the executive’s confidence
that (i) the connections exist at all, (ii) the connections are
strong, and (iii) the executive can successfully estimate that
strength. For some executives, complexity can reduce that
confidence, and thereby reduce the subjective value that he
or she places on the incentive and the motivation it instills.
For example, consider Mr. Moorman in 2014. His annual
bonus at NSC depended 50% on the company’s operating
income, 35% on its operating ratio, and 15% on a composite
service measure, which itself depended 30% on adherence to
operating plan, 30% on connection performance, and 40% on
train performance.94 For purposes of the annual incentive

91 ALEXANDER PEPPER, THE ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY OF INCENTIVES:
NEW DESIGN PRINCIPLES FOR EXECUTIVE PAY 33 (2015) [hereinafter PEPPER,
PSYCHOLOGY OF INCENTIVES BOOK] (emphasis added).
92 Id. at 61.
93 Theorists express this connection in an equation and with academic
terms. See Alexander Pepper & Julie Gore, The Economic Psychology of
Incentives: An International Study of Top Managers, 49 J. WORLD BUS.
350, 352 (2014) [hereinafter Pepper & Gore, Psychology of Incentives
Article]. Of course, a board might use a complex formula to measure a
CEO’s performance rather than to motivate particular decisions, in which
case the effect on incentives would be either irrelevant or incidental. But
that is not why companies use these complicated systems. They are
explicitly incentives. Thus, NSC called its annual award to Mr. Moorman
an “Annual Incentive,” with the company “set[ting] performance levels
required to achieve 100% of the annual incentive opportunity so that the
full bonus is only earned in years where our results are exceptional.” NSC
2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 55. Similarly, the company called
all of its equity compensation “Long-Term Incentive Awards,” explaining
that it “allocated 2014 long-term incentive awards 35% as stock options,
15% as restricted stock units, and 50% as performance share units.” Id. at
56.
94 NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 54–56.
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payment, NSC measured each of these variables over the
single year for which NSC was awarding the bonus.95 Mr.
Moorman’s PSUs, on the other hand, depended on rolling
three-year cycles, with the number of shares transferred to
Mr. Moorman at the end of each cycle depending (i) 50% on
return on invested capital during the cycle’s three years and
(ii) 50% on NSC’s TSR over those three years, compared with
the TSR for comparable railroads, or alternatively, with the
TSR for the S&P 500.96
Now think whether Mr. Moorman could confidently draw
a straight line between an executive decision that he faced
and the value he personally would reap from his
compensation package. Suppose that, at the beginning of
2014, Mr. Moorman considered whether to either (a) make a
major capital investment in new locomotives and freight cars
to replace locomotives and cars (“rolling stock”) in the NSC
fleet,97 or (b) not to make that investment. To simplify
discussion, assume immediate delivery of the new rolling
stock. Further, assume that this capital investment (i) would
not lead to an increase in railroad revenue in the current
year but would lead to an increase in future years; (ii) would
increase depreciation expense in the current and future
years; (iii) would not reduce maintenance expenses in the
current year (as employees would have to devote time to
learning new maintenance protocols), but would reduce
maintenance expenses in future years; and (iv) would
increase average invested capital in the current and future
years.98
The complicated performance formulae determining Mr.
Moorman’s annual bonus and the number of shares he
95

Id.
Id. at 57–59.
97 At the end of 2014, NSC owned more than 4200 locomotives and
more than 71,000 freight cars. NSC 2015 10-K, supra note 2, at K9.
98 See id. at K35 (“As a capital-intensive company, we have most of
our capital invested in such property. The replacement cost of these assets,
as well as the related depreciation expense, would be substantially greater
than the amounts reported on the basis of historical cost.”).
96
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ultimately would receive from PSU grants could only affect
Mr. Moorman’s decision on this possible capital investment if
Mr. Moorman knew the effect of his decision on that bonus
and on the number of shares he ultimately would obtain
through his PSU grants. If he did not know how the decision
would affect his compensation, then the formulae
determining that effect could not guide his decision. In that
event, at least with respect to this particular decision, the
incentives would be useless.
Under the assumptions set out above, there is a good
chance that in 2014, Mr. Moorman would have had little
confidence that he could predict the effect of his decision on
his incentive compensation. If he decided to buy the new
rolling stock, that capital investment would decrease the
company’s operating income and increase its operating ratio
in the current year.99 Both of those numerical changes would
decrease Mr. Moorman’s annual bonus for 2014. But the
capital investment might improve connection and train
performance, which would in turn increase Mr. Moorman’s
2014 cash bonus. Mr. Moorman would therefore need to
perform a multidimensional computation to determine the
net effect on his annual 2014 cash incentive payment of the
decision to buy the new locomotives and freight cars. Of
course, looking ahead to future years, he would have to
estimate the effect of the capital investment on his annual
cash incentive payments in those later annual cycles. The
effect on those more distant payments would be different
than the effect in 2014, as the new rolling stock would
decrease maintenance costs in those years, and hopefully
contribute to better service that would increase revenue.
Thus, operating income would increase and, together with

99 Under these assumptions, the investment does not affect
maintenance or increase revenues in the first year but does increase
depreciation, which has the net effect of reducing operating income. See
infra note 278 . Since the increase in depreciation increases the numerator
in the calculation of operating ratio, see infra note 279, and since the
investment does not increase revenue in the first year (the denominator in
the ratio), the net effect is to increase the ratio.
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lower maintenance costs, drive the operating ratio down. But
whether those gains would swamp the effect of the increased
depreciation cost—which would continue to drag down
operating income and increase operating ratio—might well
be unclear.
Complex and uncertain as these calculations would be,
they would only begin Mr. Moorman’s quest to compute how
buying new freight cars and locomotives would affect his
overall compensation. Turning to his PSU grants, he would
have to consider each of the three-year PSU cycles then
underway. For each cycle, Mr. Moorman would have to
consider how the investment would affect each of the two
variables that determined the number of NSC shares he
would receive from the grants.100 The increase in invested
capital and decrease in net income (from increased
depreciation) would decrease return on invested capital
(“ROIC”) in the current year; but the new rolling stock could
decrease maintenance costs and, if the improved rolling
stock attracted more freight business in later years, increase
revenue. Those two financial effects might overwhelm the
effect of the increased depreciation and increased invested
capital. If Mr. Moorman forecasted that result, he might
anticipate that the purchase of the new locomotives and
freight cars would
•

decrease the average ROIC in the three-year cycle
coming to an end in the current year and thereby
decrease the number of shares Mr. Moorman would
have received from the PSU grant based on ROIC
performance during that cycle had he decided against
making the investment;

100 Indeed, three variables, as in the years before 2014, NSC split the
PSU grants into three different pieces, with one of them determined by
operating ratio—an additional complexity omitted here. NSC Form, Proxy
Statement (Form DEF 14A) 42–45 (Mar. 19, 2014). The company
eliminated that metric from the performance share formula in 2015, on
the ground that use of it there was duplicative of its use in computing the
annual cash incentive award. NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12,
at 33, 50.
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have little or no effect on the average ROIC in the
three-year cycle coming to an end next year (because
the investment would lower ROIC in one of those
three years and raise it in another), thus having little
or no net effect on the number of shares Mr. Moorman
would receive from the PSU grant based on ROIC
performance during that cycle; and
increase ROIC in the three-year cycle that had just
begun (because the investment would lower the ROIC
in the current year but increase it during the next two
years) and thereby increase the number of shares Mr.
Moorman would receive during that cycle based on
ROIC performance.101

If the PSU scheme is to affect Mr. Moorman’s decision to
buy or not buy the new rolling stock, he would have to
perform the same multicycle computation for the other PSU
variable—NSC TSR relative to that of other North American
Class I Railroads and the S&P 500. Again, the investment
could have differing effects on Norfolk Southern’s TSR in the
differing cycles. Beyond that, Mr. Moorman would have to
include in his calculations a dynamic variable—whether the
other North American Class I Railroads might make a
similar investment—which could affect their TSRs and
thereby affect NSC’s TSR performance relative to that of the
other railroads.
After calculating (or at least estimating) both the effect of
the locomotive and freight car purchase on his annual bonus
and the effect of that investment on the shares he would
receive from each of the three ongoing three-year PSU cycles,
Mr. Moorman would have still more work to perform. He
would have to project the effect of the capital investment on
the per-share price of NSC stock. And he would have to
consider how developments apart from the capital
investment would likely affect the price of NSC stock, which

101 This assumes very large benefits in years two and three, providing
a relatively short-term payoff for a long-term investment.
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would introduce additional uncertainty.102 For the price of
that stock would determine the value of each share his PSU
awards ultimately would yield, as well as the value of the
restricted shares that would vest in future years, and the
value of his options (both vested and unvested), with
differing exercise prices.
As this discussion demonstrates, Mr. Moorman would
find it quite difficult to calculate the overall effect on his
compensation from buying new locomotives and freight cars.
If he had no significant confidence that he could make an
accurate calculation, then complex incentives would fail to
guide his decision. The whole intricate scheme would be
irrelevant. Even if he had some confidence in at least a rough
calculation of the capital investment decision’s impact on the
value of his pay package, the power of the incentives to guide
his decision would depend on the strength of that confidence.
The incentives’ power would decrease as Mr. Moorman’s
uncertainty about his decision’s effect on his compensation
increased, and as the range of the possible impact
broadened.
Turning back from this concrete example to theory,
behaviorists would say that Mr. Moorman may have
discounted his pay for all of this uncertainty. The theory
predicts that such a discount for “uncertainty (i.e.,
indeterminable expected values)”103 would have been in

Events support the view that the company’s share return was hard
to predict. In 2015, NSC’s stock price was hurt by a decline in the demand
for coal, and therefore for train service to haul coal, and falling oil prices,
which reduced the costs of truck operation to a greater extent than they
reduced the costs of rail transportation. See Zacks Equity Research,
Railroad Headwinds: Low Coal Demand, Oil Price Slump, ZACKS (Aug. 26,
2015), http://www.zacks.com/commentary/54729/railroad-headwinds-lowcoal-demand-oil-price-slump.html [https://perma.cc/P4ZB-BVRS]. But the
stock price was helped by a takeover bid. See Reem Nasr, Norfolk
Southern, Canadian Pacific Shares Jump Amid Deal Report, CNBC (Nov.
10, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/09/norfolk-southern-canadianpacific-shares-jump-amid-deal-report.html [https://perma.cc/DUM3-QJ5S].
103 Pepper & Gore, Psychology of Incentives Article, supra note 93, at
355; PEPPER, PSYCHOLOGY OF INCENTIVES BOOK, supra note 91, at 61 (“[T]he
102
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addition to his discount for risk aversion.104 The discount
would have derived from Mr. Moorman’s subjective
assessment that the nuanced incentives were not worth
much to him as a decision-making tool because he could not
use them in any reasonably certain predictive way to turn
his decisions into personal monetary gain. He may have
looked at the incentive package as largely a lottery and,
while confident that it would yield some large amount
regardless of his decisions, discounted significantly the
marginal value that his individual decisions would have
upon the package’s ultimate value.
Any such discount, of course, imposes a cost on a company
and affects the ability of the compensation package to
motivate. For example, if a company intends by its pay
package to transfer $X in value to its CEO and the CEO
subjectively discounts the compensation by 20% due to its
complexity, the company must increase the objective value of
the compensation to 1.25 $X in order to transfer the desired
amount. The discount will also mean that compensation at
objective value $X will provide only .8 $X in motivation.
Research supports the notion that some executives
discount their complex incentive pay precisely in this way.
In-depth interviews by Alexander Pepper of fifteen senior
executives in the United Kingdom yielded the comment by
one CEO that “[d]eferred share schemes are basically
somewhat poorly understood, . . . pretty arbitrary,” and,
these days, “extraordinarily complex.”105 Interviewees
identified use of “comparative performance measures, such
subjectively perceived value of long-term incentives is systematically
underestimated by senior executives” by reason of, among other things,
“uncertainty aversion.”); id. at 76 (defining uncertainty as indeterminable
expected values).
104 PEPPER, PSYCHOLOGY OF INCENTIVES BOOK, supra note 91, at 68.
105 Id. at 18. Pepper describes the exploratory study as consisting of
semi-structured interviews with “15 senior executives from companies in
the FTSE 350.” Id. at 15. The FTSE 350 is an index of “large and mid cap
stocks traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), which pass screening
for size and liquidity.” FTSE RUSSELL, FTSE 350 FACTSHEET (Apr. 28,
2017).
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as relative total shareholder return” as a particular
problem.106 As one CEO observed: “I don’t know how to
manage relative TSR . . . you don’t wake up in the morning
trying to manage something relative.”107 Putting it another
way, relative TSR was out of the executives’ “line of sight”
that “link[s] . . . effort, performance, and reward.”108
A larger study by Pepper, consisting of survey responses
in October and November 2011 from 756 top managers in
more than fifteen countries,109 showed that the executives,
considered as a group, exhibited some degree of aversion to
“uncertainty.” Pepper measured uncertainty by three
questions and found that many CEOs preferred
(i) compensation packages with a fixed point probability for a
fixed dollar future bonus over packages offering the same
fixed dollar future bonus but subject to a range of
probabilities (some below the fixed point and some above);
(ii) packages with a guaranteed fixed dollar future bonus
over packages with a guaranteed fixed number of shares
delivered in a known period, but with no guarantee of share
price when the shares would be conveyed; and (iii) packages
with a fixed dollar future bonus that would be triggered by a
percentage change in company performance in excess of a
percentage change in the Retail Price Index over packages
with a bonus paid in a number of shares determined by their
companies’ TSR relative to the TSR of comparable
companies, and with no guarantee of the price of the shares
when
conveyed.110
An
augmented
survey
that

PEPPER, PSYCHOLOGY OF INCENTIVES BOOK, supra note 91, at 18.
Id.
108 Id. at 21.
109 Id. at 63–64. Pepper defined “top managers” to be “very senior
executives who are responsible for defining and executing a firm’s
strategy, who through their actions are capable of affecting the company’s
profits, share price, reputation and market positioning.” Id. at 36. These
include the CEO, chief operating officer, and chief financial officer. Id. For
a further description of the survey, see Pepper & Gore, Psychology of
Incentives Article, supra note 93, at 353.
110 The three questions designed to test for uncertainty aversion are:
106
107
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1. You are invited to participate in a one-off gamble. Which
of the following choices would you prefer?
A. 50% chance of winning $5,250; otherwise nothing.
B. A chance P% of winning $5,250 where P is
unknown but is expected to be somewhere
between 25% and 75%.
C. I am indifferent between A and B.
2. Given that the annual bonus of a senior executive in a
large company is around $45,000 and the median longterm incentive award is around $67,500 a year, which of
the following choices would you prefer?
A. A guaranteed bonus of $45,000 payable in three
years’ time.
B. A guaranteed bonus of 10,000 shares deliverable
in three years’ time. The current share price is
$4.50. In the past 12 months the share price has
fluctuated between $2.25 and $6.75.
C. I am indifferent between A and B.
3. Given the same facts as question [2] . . . , which of the
following would you prefer?
A. A cash bonus of up to $52,500 payable in three
years’ time provided that your employing
company’s earnings per share during the period
grows at least 3% in excess of the Retail Price
Index.
B. A bonus of up to 11,650 shares deliverable in
three years’ time, depending upon the company’s
relative total shareholder return over the period
compared with a basket of comparable
companies. The current share price is $2.95. In
the last 12 months the share price has fluctuated
between $2.50 and $3.75. In previous years bonus
payments have ranged between 62% and 72% of
target.
C. I am indifferent between A and B.
PEPPER, PSYCHOLOGY OF INCENTIVES BOOK, supra note 91, at 65–66, 75–76,
145–46. Pepper adjusted the amounts of money in the questions depending
on survey respondents’ statements of how much money they made
($350,000 or less per year in total compensation; between $350,000 and
$725,000; and $725,000 or more). Id. at 65–67, 144. The amounts in the
questions above were those in the survey provided to the lowest income
cohort. Id. at 144–46. Note that the theoretically modeled value of choice B
in the second question was $45,000 at the time of the gamble even though,
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PricewaterhouseCoopers (“PwC”) conducted in conjunction
with Pepper111 yielded the same conclusion.112
While the group results are interesting, the most
pertinent point here is that, not surprisingly, different
executives answered differently. In fact, the distributions of
the individual answers to the three questions designed to
test uncertainty aversion were very close—particularly when
the sample was segmented and only the responses of those
who had long-term incentive plans were considered. The
following tables113 show the breakdown from the 2011 study:

of course, the recipient of the gamble could win more or less depending on
where the stock price finished at the end of the three years. Id. at 66
(using a Black-Scholes model, a risk-free rate of return of 1%, stock
volatility of 50%, no dividends, and a nominal strike price as this is
essentially service-based restricted stock). Hence, the choice of A over B
was a choice of certainty over uncertainty, not a choice of expected value.
111 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS INT’L LTD., MAKING EXECUTIVE PAY
WORK: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INCENTIVES 16 (2012) [hereinafter PWC
SURVEY] (describing three questions substantially identical to those in
supra note 110). The PwC study obtained responses from 1106 executives
in forty-three countries. Id. at 2. Professor Pepper advised the author that
the “bigger N, used in the PwC report, contains a convenience sample topup in order to obtain coverage across all the PwC countries interested in
the report” and that “the statistical results, as between the larger and
smaller samples, gave, in terms of statistical significance etc., the same
results.” Email from Alexander Pepper to author (Mar. 8, 2016) (on file
with author).
112 PWC SURVEY, supra note 111, at 17.
113 PEPPER, PSYCHOLOGY OF INCENTIVES BOOK, supra note 91, at 69–70
(providing results reproduced in Tables 2 and 3 here).

FISHER – FINAL

636

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2017

TABLE 2.
Question114
A
(Favoring more
certainty)
Uncertainty
Question 1
Uncertainty
Question 2
Uncertainty
Question 3

355
47.0%
352
46.6%
382
50.5%

All Participants
B
(Favoring more
uncertainty if
there is a chance
for a higher
payoff)
268
35.4%
340
45.0%
284
37.6%

C
(Uncertainty
Neutral)
133
17.6%
64
8.5%
90
11.9%

TABLE 3.
Question

Uncertainty
Question 1
Uncertainty
Question 2
Uncertainty
Question 3

Participants with Long-Term Incentive Plans
B
(Favoring more
A
C
uncertainty if
(Favoring more
(Uncertainty
there is a chance
certainty)
Neutral)
for a higher
payoff)
162
144
59
44.4%
39.5%
16.2%
169
162
34
46.3%
44.4%
9.3%
174
158
33
47.7%
43.3%
9.0%

Thus, in every case—for every question and both for the
full set of respondents and the subset who had long-term
incentive plans already (and therefore presumably had a
better understanding of them)—more than 35% of
respondents favored the uncertain alternative that provided
either a chance of a higher percentage of a given payout or a
chance of a higher payout. Focusing on the respondents with

114 Id. at 65–66, 75–76, 145–46; see also supra notes 91 & 110
(containing the three questions).

FISHER –FINAL

No. 2:599]

TO THINE OWN CEO BE TRUE

637

long-term incentive plans common for CEOs at U.S. publicly
traded companies, the respondents on the three questions
split roughly 46% favoring more certainty, 42% favoring
more uncertainty, and 11.5% indifferent. Thus, the message
these numbers suggests is not that all companies should
decrease the complexity of the compensation schemes they
provide to their executives, but that whether complexity
increases or decreases an incentive effect, or changes it at
all, depends on the particular executive whom the company
has hired. For example, the Pepper study suggests that a
given executive has more than a 46% chance of being averse
to uncertainty.115 Thus, a company considering a complex
scheme should attempt to determine whether the individual
executive whose pay the company is constructing falls within
this 46%. If so, the company may conclude that a complicated
payout scheme will lose a considerable amount of its power
to incentivize this executive and will be, in fact, worth less to
this CEO than the package costs the company. If so, the
company should choose a simpler compensation package.
On the other hand, the Pepper study also suggests a 42%
chance that a given executive will embrace complexity and
an 11.5% chance that a given executive is indifferent to
complexity.116 Thus, a company considering a complex
scheme should attempt to determine whether the individual
executive whose pay the company is constructing may be
among one of these two groups. If so, the company should
proceed with a pay scheme as complex as other
considerations suggest is appropriate.
Because Pepper’s work included executives who were not
CEOs and his sample drew from executives in many
different countries, the numbers from his study cannot be
115

The average of the percentages favoring more certainty among the
respondents with long-term incentive plans—column A of Table 3—is
46.13%.
116 The averages of the percentages, among the respondents with
long-term incentive plans, of those favoring uncertainty with a chance of a
better payoff, and those indifferent to uncertainty—columns B and C of
Table 3—are 42.4% and 11.5% respectively.
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applied uncritically to CEOs in the United States.117
However, disaggregated, the data show that the uncertainty
aversion for executives in the United States was close to the
results in the study overall,118 and close to 39% of the sample
were CEOs or equivalents.119 Consequently, although the
percentage distribution for U.S. CEOs might be somewhat
different from those discussed in the last several paragraphs,
Pepper’s work suggests with considerable force that a
substantial number of American CEOs fall into each of his
categories: (i) averse to uncertainty in the relation between
complicated incentives, their business decisions, and their
pay; (ii) content with such uncertainty if the incentives
include a chance for high payouts; and (iii) indifferent
between pay packages that provide greater certainty but
with lower payouts and pay packages that are more
uncertain but that offer higher possible payouts. Putting it
plainly, individuals differ.

b. Complexity and Insignificant Rewards for
Large Numbers of Measures and Tasks
The previous subpart concerns instances where a CEO
cannot confidently estimate how his or her decisions will
affect future compensation under the CEO compensation
plan. This subpart addresses instances in which a CEO
knows that, whatever value some particular components of
the package might ultimately deliver, the value added by
those components will be insignificant to the executive’s total
pay.
The sheer number of variables determining the pay that
the modern CEO receives—together with the weights
assigned to them—strongly suggests that some variables do
See supra note 109.
Pepper computed an uncertainty aversion index for the
subsamples from different countries. PEPPER, PSYCHOLOGY OF INCENTIVES
BOOK, supra note 91, at 72–73. He computed the median index at -.09 and
the U.S. index at -.10. Id. at 72–73.
119 The table of job titles shows 38.8% of respondents were CEOs or
presidents or managing directors, with another 8.0% chairmen. Id. at 149.
117
118
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not provide a meaningful economic incentive at all. For
example, 15% of Mr. Moorman’s 2014 annual cash incentive
payment at NSC depended on a composite service measure
that, in turn, depended 30% on a score measuring train
connection performance.120 This meant that for 2014, the
maximum amount that Mr. Moorman could receive for train
connection performance (considering that his bonus
opportunity was computed against 225% of his $1 million
salary)121 was $101,250.122 While this seems a handsome
amount to an ordinary individual, it comprised less than 1%
of Mr. Moorman’s total 2014 compensation, which exceeded
$13.5 million.123
As it happened, in 2014 the entire composite service
measure (including train connection performance, adherence
to operating plan, and train performance) was below the
threshold required for any award based on that measure.124
Yet taking into account the other factors that weighed more
heavily in the annual cash computation (operating income
counting for 50%, and operating ratio counting for 35%),125
Mr. Moorman’s cash incentive award was actually higher in
2014 than the year before.126 In that sense, the poor score on
the service measure did not punish him financially at all.
To be clear, this analysis does not suggest that Mr.
Moorman was unconcerned with train connections, train
performance, or implementation of his railroad’s operating
plan. His concern, however, most likely grew out of his forty
years of railroad experience, which very probably fostered in

NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 55.
Id. at 54, 62.
122 $2,250,000 x .15 x .3.
123 Computed by dividing the $101,250 by the $13,536,017 total
compensation, shown at page 62 of NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note
12.
124 Id. at 56.
125 Id. at 55.
126 Id. at 62 (showing the 2013 non-equity incentive plan
compensation to be $1,685,250 and the comparable figure for 2014 as
$1,813,500).
120
121
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him a commitment to keep NSC’s trains running well, on
time, and according to plan.127 The point is that he very
likely was not motivated, beyond that experience-based
concern, to pay any more attention to train connection, train
performance, and operating plan by what amounted to small
percentage additions or subtractions to his total
compensation,
which
total
would
be
determined
predominantly by other factors to which his complicated
compensation formula gave greater weight.
The compensation arrangements at Intel raise the same
issue. Operational performance determined 50% of the Intel
CEO’s annual cash incentive award for 2014.128 But Intel
calculated the score for that factor as “the corporate average”
of the company’s business unit scores, “subject to a corporate
level ‘kicker’ of 5%.”129 In turn, the corporate average derived
from the scores of ten different business units, each of which
had three or four operational goals.130 As examples, “PC
client billing volume” was one of four operational goals for
the PC Client Group and “Comms development: SoFIA
schedule” was one of four operational goals for the Platform
Engineering Group.131 Altogether, the ten business units had
thirty-two operational goals.132 Assuming that each of the
scores for the ten business groups was equally weighted and
that each operational goal within a business unit was
equally weighted within that business unit, then PC client
billing volume determined one-quarter of one-tenth of onehalf of the CEO’s cash bonus—that is, 1.25% of the annual

127 William C. Vantuono, 2011 Railroader of the Year: Wick Moorman,
Norfolk
Southern,
RAILWAY
AGE
(Dec.
12,
2011),
http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/freight/class-i/2011-railroader-ofthe-year-wick-moorman-norfolk-southern.html
[https://perma.cc/FLV3AST2] (interview with Moorman in which he states that he first went to
work for the company in 1975).
128 Intel 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 14, at 44.
129 Id. at 57.
130 Id. at 58.
131 Id. at 57–58.
132 Id. at 58.
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cash incentive to the CEO. That translated into about
$40,268,133 which in turn was less than one-half of 1% of the
CEO’s total compensation.134
Again, this analysis does not imply that the Intel CEO
was unconcerned about PC client billing volume. It strongly
suggests, however, that his concern was not prompted by
financial reward or punishment through the compensation
scheme, which was so fragmented that this lightly weighted
individual component could not significantly affect his pay.
Of course, it is possible that even small rewards for a long
list of goals might motivate as to each of the small goals—for
psychological reasons rather than monetary reasons. But
that depends on individual psychology. Thus, some top
officers might fret seriously over a low score on any
measure—no matter how many there are, no matter how
small the weight the compensation formula attributes to
each, and no matter how small the payment each generates.
For such a CEO, each small part of the pay package
motivates. Other CEOs might ignore a lengthy list and
concentrate on one or more measures that both (i) seem
better able to grade company performance overall, like stock
price performance and dividends; and (ii) are more important
to the CEO financially, as will be the stock price if the
executive has shares of company stock worth millions of
dollars.135 Whether small payments for multiple, subdivided
performance measures do any good depends on the
individual CEO.
133 Intel paid cash incentives to the CEO totaling $3,354,400,
$3,221,400 of which was annual incentive cash (the rest being quarterly
incentive cash). Id. at 53, 54. One and one-quarter percent of that annual
incentive is $40,267.50.
134 Intel reported providing total compensation to its CEO valued at
$11,197,400. Id. at 53. Dividing $40,267 by that number yields 0.0036.
While the percentage would be larger if the operational goal had been one
of only three goals for a business group, it would still have been under onehalf of 1% of total pay (1/3 of 1/10 of 1/2 is 0.0167, which multiplied by the
$3,221,400 annual cash incentive payment yields $53,797.38, which
divided by $11,197,400, yields 0.0048).
135 See Table 3, infra notes 183–201.
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The potential harm from manifold measures similarly
depends on individual personality. Thus, some CEOs might
obsess over a perfect or near-perfect score across all the
measures in their pay schemes and might therefore devote
too much attention to each of so many different specific goals
that this effort detracts from their concentration on
important strategic matters. Some CEOs might resent the
implication that the board of directors believes that the CEO
will somehow forget parts of the business unless he or she
receives a small payment for devoting some time to each
such part. Computations that include myriad variables
having inconsequential impact on total pay could degrade
the performance of these top executives.
The message is not that including a large number of
variables with low rewards is good or bad, but that whether
doing so serves a company well or ill depends on the
personality of the CEO receiving the pay. Without knowing
that personality, the company that eschews this practice can
miss an opportunity to motivate its top officer to keep his or
her eye on a host of matters that are “drivers” of the
company’s success.136 But, without knowing that personality,

136 See LARCKER & TAYAN, GOVERNANCE MATTERS, supra note 25, at
229, stating:

[O]ne way to select the measures used to award
compensation is to use those that were identified during
the business modeling process as being correlated with
success in the corporate strategy. In general, these include
a mix of accounting measures (such as economic value
added, earnings-per-share growth, and return on assets),
stock market measures (such as total shareholder return),
and nonfinancial measures (such as customer satisfaction,
product defect rates, and market share).
But Larcker and Tayan follow this explanation with an exposition of the
four financial and six nonfinancial metrics used in determining 2013
annual performance bonuses for Northrop Grumman NEOs, adding the
questions: “Are the large number of financial and nonfinancial measures
in this annual bonus plan really necessary? When does a plan become too
complicated?” Id. at 231; see also MICHAEL B. DORFF, INDISPENSABLE AND
OTHER MYTHS: WHY THE CEO PAY EXPERIMENT FAILED AND HOW TO FIX IT
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the company that includes a laundry list risks motivating
resentment rather than performance, distracting CEO
attention from critical company decisions, or simply
producing a scheme that it can flourish to shareholders but
which has no real impact because the CEO ignores it.

2. Individual Valuation of Contingent Equity
Awards
Companies pay top executives in cash and equity. Equity
dominates. When companies pay this form of compensation
and
ignore
individual
personality
and
financial
circumstances, large and distinct problems follow.
Equity comprised more than 50% of CEO pay at the
Exemplar Companies in 2014. According to NSC’s summary
compensation table, slightly more than 55% of Mr.
Moorman’s 2014 compensation consisted of equity awards—
with those awards valued at cost to NSC as computed per
accounting rules.137 So computed (with an adjustment in the
JPM figure for a change in the year of one award), equity
awards at the other four Exemplar Companies bulked
similarly large in the total 2014 compensation paid to their
CEOs: Intel (59%),138 Chevron (52%),139 J&J (55%),140 and
JPM (55%).141
250–51 (2014) (arguing that no score on any single measure should reward
an executive with “enormous pay”); id. at 253–55 (using AutoZone, Inc. as
an example, arguing that its then-current pay system should be replaced
with “a carefully calibrated system of bonuses linked to a large number of
metrics”); id. at 253 (suggesting a bonus calculation with weighted scores
in seven different categories of factors “that AutoZone’s public filings
singled out as being important to the company’s success”); id. at 253–55
(many of which are subdivided into more than one variable, producing a
total of twenty-three different metrics, eight of which would each count for
only 1% or 2% of the total bonus payout).
137 NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 62 (adding the
$4,879,422 in stock awards to the $2,624,976 option award, then dividing
by the total compensation figure of $13,536,017). For the accounting rules,
see infra notes 150–156.
138 Intel 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 14, at 53 (dividing the
$6,658,700 in stock awards by the $11,197,400 in total compensation).

FISHER – FINAL

644

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2017

These figures reflect the norm. For example, one
commercial study of 2014 CEO pay at companies in the S&P
1500 reported that top executives received on average 53% of
their total compensation in equity.142
The equity included in CEO compensation has only
contingent value. That is, the ultimate value that the CEO
realizes from the equity award is contingent on future
events. Thus NSC granted Mr. Moorman an option award in
2014 permitting him—after the options vested four years
later and continuing thereafter for six years—to buy up to
87,880 shares of NSC common stock at a price of $94.170 per
share,143 the market price of NSC shares on the grant
date.144 The value of these options was contingent upon
whether the price of the company’s stock exceeds the $94.170
per share exercise price during the period in which he would
be able to exercise the options (2018–2024). Similarly, in
2014 NSC granted Mr. Moorman an award of 11,950 shares
of service-based restricted stock, vesting in five years.145 The
value of those restricted shares was contingent on the price
139 Chevron 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 18, at 44 (adding the
$4,816,500 in stock awards to the $8,586,240 option award, then dividing
by the $25,970,417 in total compensation).
140 J&J 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 16, at 54 (adding the
$9,467,380 in stock awards to the $4,168,139 option award, then dividing
by $24,989,306 in total compensation).
141 JPM 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 20, at 44, 49 (dividing the
$11,100,000 stock award by the total $20,000,000 compensation). The
computation uses this figure instead of computing the percentage from the
summary compensation table because the equity figures in the summary
compensation table included some 2013 compensation due to the timing of
awards. Id. at 58 n.5 to tbl.
142 EQUILAR, 2015 CEO PAY STRATEGIES 9 fig.3 (providing figures for
2014). “The S&P Composite 1500® combines three leading indices, the
S&P 500®, the S&P MidCap 400®, and the S&P SmallCap 600® to cover
approximately 90% of the U.S. market capitalization.” S&P DOW JONES
INDICES, http://us.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-composite-1500 [https://
perma.cc/EZC8-EF98] (last visited May 22, 2017).
143 NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 68.
144 Id. at 56.
145 Id. at 65.
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of the company’s stock after the restrictions expired in 2019.
In the same way, NSC granted Mr. Moorman PSUs in 2014
that would transfer to him three years later some number of
NSC shares determined by a complicated formula including
average after-tax return on average invested capital over the
three years, and NSC’s TSR relative to either the TSR for
other railroads or the TSR for the S&P 500.146 The ultimate
value of that award was contingent both on the performance
measures that would determine how many shares he would
receive at the end of the three-year performance cycle and on
the market price of NSC stock at that time.147
A very considerable body of theoretical and empirical
work has demonstrated that the subjective value of such
contingent equity awards to a CEO is lower than the
objective cost of such awards to the company granting
them.148 Moreover, the theory and empirical studies
demonstrate that different CEOs discount the value of such
awards—off the company cost—by different amounts,
depending on their individual characteristics and
circumstances.149 Thus, different executives will place
different subjective values on the same equity grant.
Accounting rules measure the cost to a company of the
contingent equity it grants by the fair value that the
company gives up when it makes the grant.150 The cost of a
service-based restricted stock award is the market value of
the company’s stock on the date of the grant, multiplied by
the number of shares in the award,151 with the cost reduced
Id. at 57.
Id.
148 See the remainder of this Part III.B.2, particularly notes 159–180
infra and accompanying text.
149 Id.
150 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION: A
MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 1-13 (2d ed. July 2015) [hereinafter PWC,
STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION] (“The fair value of an award is the cost to
the company of granting the award and should reflect the estimated value
that the company would be obligated to provide when an employee is
entitled to the award . . . .”).
151 Id. at 8-9.
146
147
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to reflect an estimated (then trued up) forfeiture rate by
failure to continue to work at the company through the
vesting period.152 The cost of a time-vested stock option is the
value of the option grant on the date of the grant, as
determined by a mathematical model—either the BlackScholes model or the binomial model (also known as the
lattice model).153 Both these models are based on (i) the price
of the stock on the grant date, (ii) the exercise price for the
option, and (iii) the following assumptions or estimates: (a)
the expected term of the option (how long until actually
exercised), (b) the volatility of the price of the underlying
stock, (c) the risk-free interest rate, and (d) the expected
dividend rate.154 Companies recognize the cost of an option

Id. at 1-42 (“[C]ompanies are required to develop an assumption
regarding the prevesting forfeiture rate beginning on the grant date,
which will impact the estimated amount of compensation expense to be
recorded over the requisite service period. Companies are required to trueup forfeiture estimates for all awards with performance and service
conditions through the vesting date so that compensation cost is
recognized only for awards that vest.”) (citation omitted). The company
recognizes the cost of a restricted stock grant over the vesting period. Id.
at 8-9.
153 Id. at 1-16, ch. 6.
154 Id. at 7-2. The company recognizes the option expense, computed
by the model, over the vesting period. Id. at 8-9. If an executive leaves a
company after an option grant but before the option vests, the executive
typically forfeits the option. KOLB, NOT ENOUGH, supra note 25, at 57. If
the executive leaves the firm after the option vests but before it has
expired, the executive typically must either exercise the option at or near
the time of departure or forfeit the option. Id. If the executive remains
with the company through the entire exercise period, the executive can
exercise at any point during that period. PWC, STOCK-BASED
COMPENSATION, supra note 150, at 7-4 (“Because employees typically
cannot exercise an option until it vests, the vesting date represents the low
end of the range of possible exercise dates, whereas the contractual term
represents the high end of the possible range. An analysis of historical
exercise and post-vesting cancellation behavior is generally used to
estimate where within this range the exercise or post-vesting cancellation
may occur. A company should use its relevant historical information, as
listed above, for similar options and employee groups.”). The volatility of
152
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grant over the vesting period, and that time-based
recognition permits them to adjust cost if an executive leaves
the company before the vesting period runs and thereby
forfeits the option.155 The cost of a performance share award
is the market value of the company’s stock on the date the
company grants the award multiplied by the maximum
number of possible shares that could be awarded, discounted
for the probabilities that (i) different levels of performance
will be achieved and (ii) the recipient will fail to continue to
work at the company through the performance cycle.156
Although the calculation of contingent equity cost to a
company is complex, it is objective and based on observable
facts. As long as these facts are the same from one company
to another, the cost of the grant is the same. Moreover, the
cost is real and concrete in the sense that each company
must include the calculated cost of each contingent equity
grant as part of reported compensation expense, which
decreases its reported earnings.157
Financial theory, however, identifies subtle complications
in how the individual executive subjectively values
contingent equity, depending on characteristics and
circumstances peculiar to that individual. An understanding
of the theory best begins with common sense. Intuitively,
the stock is the standard deviation of the stock price, often estimated by
historical volatility for the company or its peers. Id. at 7-23 to -26.
155 PWC, STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION, supra note 150, at 7-3 to -4
(“[P]re-vesting forfeitures . . . are taken into account by the company
recognizing compensation cost only for those awards for which employees
render the requisite service.”).
156 Id. at 1-22 to -24. The company recognizes the expense when it is
probable that the required performance will be achieved—net of an
estimate of pre-vesting forfeiture—reassessing that probability each
reporting period, then trues-up at the end of the vesting period so that the
total expense recognized reflects the actual number of shares awarded. Id.
at 1-24, 1-26, 8-9.
157 KOLB, NOT ENOUGH, supra note 25, at 66–69 (tracing the history,
ending with FAS 123R, which now requires expensing option
compensation); PWC, STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION, supra note 150, at 1-2
n.1 (after the codification of U.S. generally accepted accounting principles,
requirement for expensing located in ASC 718).
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concentration of wealth in one or only a few assets is risky as
it involves putting financial eggs into one, or just a few,
baskets. More formally, a CEO may have undiversified
wealth. A CEO usually owns equity in his or her company
outright (that is, without contingencies), and thereby risks a
decrease in that portion of investment wealth should a
decline in the company’s economic fortunes result in a stock
price decline. As the percentage of the executive’s investment
wealth comprised of such equity increases, the executive’s
economic well-being becomes more concentrated in the fate
of the company, and his or her investment risk grows.158 In
addition, different individuals display differing degrees of
personal risk aversion; that is, aversion to risking either (i)
decreases in personal wealth or (ii) increases in their wealth
that are lower than expected or planned.
All of this suggests that when a CEO with relatively high
risk aversion already has a large percentage of investment
wealth tied up in company equity, that CEO will
substantially discount the value of additional contingent
equity provided as compensation. It also suggests that
different CEOs will subjectively discount the same contingent
equity pay package differently, depending on their individual
risk aversion and the proportion of investment wealth
comprised of company equity before they receive the
additional contingent equity award. If an award also
provides that the executive will forfeit options or restricted
stock if he or she leaves the company before vesting,
different executives will have different discount rates on the
same grant if they subjectively estimate different
probabilities that they will depart before that time.

158 Since he or she usually works exclusively for one company, the
CEO has committed all of his or her human capital to that company and
risks a decline in the return on that capital should the company’s economic
fortunes decline to the point that it has to cut compensation. This
circumstance aggravates the problems created by concentration of
investment wealth in company equity, since the same events that could
reduce the company’s ability to pay would likely also reduce the price of its
stock.
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Economists have for years worked with models that
formalize these ideas.159 The results are quite startling. An
early analysis discussed a hypothetical executive with
wealth (exclusive of the option grant discussed next) worth
$10,000,000, who was granted a ten-year option on 10,000
shares of stock, with both the price of the stock at grant and
at exercise equal to $50, with a 20% stock price variance, and
an expected compounded stock return of 12% annually.160
The Black-Scholes calculation (reflecting the cost to the
company) valued the award at $351,260.161 Application of a
model utility function showed that an executive with low
proportional risk aversion and only 10% of his or her
$10,000,000 wealth in company equity would subjectively
value the option award at $321,500.162 However, the model
showed that the value of the option award decreased if the
hypothetical executive was more risk averse and held a
higher percentage of investment wealth in company
equity.163 At the highest relative risk aversion and with 90%
of the $10,000,000 wealth tied up in company equity already,
the executive would subjectively value the new option grant
at only $19,700.164
A later study, employing a slightly different model,
hypothesized an executive who received a ten-year option on
one share of stock.165 Assuming a $30/share stock price on
the grant date, a $30/share exercise price, and 30% stock
price volatility, the Black-Scholes method computed the cost
of the option award to the company at $16.55.166 However,
an executive with relatively low risk aversion and 50% of $5
E.g., KOLB, NOT ENOUGH, supra note 25, at 87–88.
Richard A. Lambert et al., Portfolio Considerations in Valuing
Executive Compensation, 29 J. ACCT. RES. 129, 134 (1991).
161 Id. at 135 tbl.1 n.a.
162 Id. at 135 tbl.1.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified
Executives, 33 J ACCT. & ECON. 3, 10 (2002).
166 Id. at 12 tbl.1.
159
160
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million wealth invested in company equity (holding the rest
in cash) would, if rationally employing the posited utility
function, value the option at only 63.5% of the Black-Scholes
value (i.e., $10.51); and an executive with relatively high
risk aversion and 67% of investment wealth already in
company equity (again holding the rest of non-firm wealth in
cash) would value the option at only 21.1% of the BlackScholes value (i.e., $3.49).167
A third theoretical work provided discounts for both
options and service-based restricted stock. The study
assumed that a company granted an executive a five-year
option on stock with a market price at $30/share, 30%
market price volatility, and an expected return of 10%.168 If
the exercise price equaled $30/share, the stock’s beta equaled
1, the recipient executive had low relative risk aversion, and
only 30% of his or her wealth in options, the executive would
subjectively discount the Black-Scholes value of the option by
34.5%.169 However, the executive would discount the BlackScholes value by 86.1% if all the conditions remained the
same, except that the executive’s relative risk aversion
doubled and the executive held 70% of his or her wealth in
options.170
This last work found a similar pattern, albeit with
smaller variations, when the exercise price of the option
dropped to zero—meaning that the option mimicked servicebased restricted stock, which the executive receives without
paying anything to the company but simply by remaining
employed through the vesting period.171 With all the
167 Id. The authors defined the subjective value to the executive as the
“certainty equivalence” of the option, which they described as “the amount
of riskless cash compensation the executive would exchange for the
option.” Id. at 9.
168 Yisong S. Tian, Too Much of a Good Incentive? The Case of
Executive Stock Options, 28 J. BANKING & FINANCE 1225, 1234 tbl.3 (2014).
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 171 (2004) (explaining
that restricted stock is an option with an exercise price of $0).
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conditions in the last paragraph except an exercise price at
zero, the low-risk-aversion executive with only 30% of wealth
in company options would discount the value of the $30 in
restricted stock by 7.2% off the Black-Scholes value, while
the high-risk-aversion executive with 70% of wealth in
company options would discount the restricted stock by
28.4%.172
Other academic analyses, using utility function models,
confirm these results.173 Thus well-established financial
theory suggests not only that executives discount future
contingent equity by very significant amounts, but the
amount of the discount will vary tremendously from one
individual executive to another, depending on the personal
characteristics of the particular executive—particularly his
or her aversion to risk in personal financial affairs and the
proportion of his or her wealth already committed to
company equity.
These theoretical studies are important because empirical
work confirms that different executives, in fact, have
differing degrees of risk aversion and differing percentages of
their wealth invested in equity issued by their firms. Using
data from a sample of 65,000 option exercises by
approximately 7000 executives during the period from 1996
to 2008, one study found implied risk aversion that varied
from 0.110 at the 10th percentile, to 0.911 at the median, to
6.170 at the 90th percentile.174 The United States does not
Tian, supra note 168, at 1234 tbl.3.
KOLB, NOT ENOUGH, supra note 25, at 87–88 (referencing some of
the studies in the text, and others).
174 Steffen Brenner, The Risk Preferences of U.S. Executives, 61
MGMT. SCI. 1344, 1345, 1349 (2015) (describing sample); id. at 1346–48
(describing the methodology by which the researcher derived implied risk
aversion from option exercises); id. at 1350 tbl.4 (showing percentile
distribution of derived risk aversions). The executives in the sample
included CEOs as well as other high-ranking officers such as CFOs and
executive vice presidents. Id. at 1350 tbl.3. Although the article did not
separately provide a percentile distribution for the risk aversions derived
from the 16,400 option exercises by CEOs in the sample, id. at 1350 tbl.3,
it did identify the mean derived CEO risk aversion as 1.92, the median as
172
173
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require that CEOs or other executives at publicly traded
companies disclose their total personal wealth or the
percentage of that wealth consisting of equity interests in
their companies. But using a technique that estimates the
amount of non-firm wealth, the same study that estimated
executive risk aversion also derived the non-firm wealth for
the 7000 executives.175 It found a wide range in the
proportion of wealth that the executives held in the form of
their firms’ stock.176
Empirical studies that directly attempt to derive the
subjective value of options and restricted stock also conclude
that executives generally value options and restricted stock
below the price of those compensation vehicles to their
companies and that the degree of the discount depends
critically on the characteristics of the individual.177 As one
0.59 and the standard deviation as 5.50, id. at 1351 tbl.5. The difference
between the median and the mean, and the large standard deviation,
substantiates a wide range of CEO risk aversion.
175 Id. at 1349 (explaining the technique used).
176 Id. at 1349 tbl.2 (reporting the mean ratio of non-firm to total
wealth in the sample equal to 0.555, with a standard deviation of 0.239).
177 In 2004, the Watson Wyatt consulting firm published the results of
an online survey of high-income employees that, among other things,
asked the employees to identify trade-offs between stock options at their
companies and cash. WATSON WYATT WORLDWIDE, HOW DO EMPLOYEES
VALUE STOCK OPTIONS? 5–6 (describing sample of 1000 respondents from
more than 300 companies and describing methodology). Watson Wyatt
then compared the difference between the cash equivalent, as identified by
the survey respondents, and the value of the options, as computed using
the Black-Scholes method. The employees generally valued options at a
cash equivalent below the value of the options as computed by BlackScholes. Significantly for the discussion here, Watson Wyatt estimated
that employees who were “conservative” investors on average discounted
the options by 41% off the Black-Scholes value and that employees who
were “aggressive” investors discounted the options by only 36%. Id. at 11
tbl.4. Moreover, the average estimated discounts increased when Watson
Wyatt increased the number of shares in the hypothetical grant from 100
options to 500 options, with the estimated average discount applied by
“conservative” investors increasing to 53% off the Black-Scholes value and
the estimated average discount applied by “aggressive” investors
increasing to 41%. Id. at 11 tbl.3.
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researcher puts it, the empirical evidence “suggests that it is
necessary to measure executives’ equity incentives from their
personal perspective.”178
Aggravating this problem, recent research by behavioral
economists suggests that a significant proportion of
executives discount future payouts (which include payouts
with which this Article is concerned, from equity that can be
converted into cash only after time vesting, or performance
vesting over a multiyear performance cycle) at a far higher
rate than financial theory would employ—with these
discount rates, simply for delayed realization, up to or
exceeding 30%.179 However, once again, individuals differ. In
Using a similar method to determine the subjective value of restricted
stock to survey participants, Watson Wyatt found that conservative
investors discounted restricted stock by 22% off the grant date stock price,
while the aggressive investors discounted restricted stock by 10%. Id. at 12
tbl.5. Although Watson Wyatt did not provide the numbers, they reported
that “[f]or larger grants, employees place a greater discount on the value of
those [restricted] shares . . . .” Id. at 7.
An unpublished study attempted to derive CEOs’ subjective value of
their equity holdings in their companies by studying stock sales and option
exercises during 1996–2005, with the sample covering 1651 individual
CEOs over 9507 executive years. Christopher S. Armstrong, The Incentives
of Equity-Based Compensation and Wealth 20–22 (Feb. 14, 2007),
https://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/accounting/papers/Chris%20Armstr
ong%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/7329-DL7L]. The study concluded that “most
executives subjectively value their equity holdings below the risk-neutral
expected value which is consistent with risk aversion and lack of
diversification affecting their valuations.” Id. at 44.
178 Armstrong, supra note 177, at 44.
179 Behavioral economists characterize these as “hyperbolic” rates. See
Pepper & Gore, Psychology of Incentives Article, supra note 93, at 352
(“Time effects are determined by a hyperbolic discount function . . . ,
rather than the more conventional exponential discounting function used
in finance and discounted utility theory. Hyperbolic discounting has been
extensively tested in experiments and in field research and is the
dominant theory of inter-temporal choice favored by behavioral economists
. . . .”) (citations omitted). The Pepper study, described in supra note 109
and accompanying text, asked three questions to determine the time
discounts that survey participants employed. PEPPER, PSYCHOLOGY OF
INCENTIVES BOOK, supra note 91, at 66, 70 tbl.4.1 (showing results of
answers to three “Time” questions), 145. Pepper computed the median
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fact, a large minority of respondents (more than one-third)
selected answers to survey questions that did not imply an
outsize discount rate.180 Behavioral theory would posit that
the differences are driven by individual psychology.
Taken altogether, the theory and empirical evidence show
that the value one CEO subjectively places on a package of
contingent equity incentives may differ from the value that a
second CEO places on the same package. Further, the two
values may be far apart if the two CEOs have significantly
different degrees of risk aversion, and hold significantly
different percentages of their total wealth in firm stock and
stock derivatives. The variance increases further if one CEO
discounts future economic benefit at the rate that rational
economics suggests and the other discounts future benefits
at a psychologically driven higher rate. This, in turn, means
that—without knowing and considering the risk aversion of
the particular individual who is the CEO at that company, or
time discount rates for all participants at 33% and for participants who
had long-term incentive plans at 32%. Id. at 70 tbl.4.1. The median
discount rate for U.S. participants in the survey equaled 30.8%. Pepper &
Gore, Psychology of Incentives Article, supra note 93, at 357 tbl.3. As
Pepper and Gore put it:
According to standard financial theory, individuals should
discount future receipts at rates which are consistent with
the return on comparably risky future cash flows, adjusted
for inflation. In the present case, time discount rates
should, therefore, have been close to the risk-free rate of
around 1% per annum, subject to local inflation, which in
2011 varied between under 1% (Switzerland) to over 9%
(Argentina) . . . .
Id. at 355–56 (citation omitted). The PwC survey yielded similar results to
virtually the same questions. PWC SURVEY, supra note 111, at 18–19
(reciting questions and estimating a 31% discount rate for both
participants overall and for the subset of North American participants).
180 PEPPER, PSYCHOLOGY OF INCENTIVES BOOK, supra note 91, at 70
tbl.4.1 (reporting the percentages who selected alternative B and who
therefore did not employ hyperbolic discount rates when answering the
three time questions as 35.1%/44.6%/36.0% for all respondents and
38.4%/46.3%/36.2% for the subset of respondents with long-term incentive
plans).
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the distribution of that individual’s investments between
company equity and other assets, and without knowing
whether the individual subjectively applies a psychologically
driven hyperbolic discount to future returns—a company
cannot have even a reasonably approximate idea of how its
CEO values his or her contingent equity incentive package.
Accordingly, the company does not know if the subjective
value of the package to the CEO is sufficient to motivate the
CEO to take the actions that will cause the package to pay
maximum rewards, or not. The company is flying blind.

3. Individual Amount of Accumulated Equity
The previous subpart discussed the effect of the
percentage of a CEO’s wealth invested in company shares
before the new grant on the value of an additional equity
grant. But the absolute value of the accumulated equity a
CEO holds—and the ratio of that absolute amount to a new
contingent equity grant—has another profound implication.
Finance academics pointed out years ago that top officers
of public companies often hold so many shares of their
companies’ stock that small changes in the per-share price of
that stock can have a far greater impact on CEO wealth than
all of the incentives provided by yearly compensation.181 That
remains true today.182 To illustrate this phenomenon and to

181 See John E. Core et al., Executive Equity Compensation and
Incentives: A Survey, 9 FRBNY POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 27, 30 (citing
studies to showing that the vast majority of a typical CEO’s incentives to
increase stock price are driven by variation in the value of his stock and
option portfolio, that is, not by flow compensation).
182 Larcker and Tayan provide a table of information about CEO
equity wealth at the 4000 largest U.S. companies, showing:
[T]he average value of CEO equity wealth is significantly
larger than the average value of annual compensation. This
means that for a typical executive, the incentives provided
by the equity holdings are at least as important and often
dominate the incentives provided by annual compensation.
As a result, a typical executive considers how decisions
potentially affect total wealth and not just one year’s pay.
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show that it varies widely across executives, Table 4 shows
equity holdings by the CEOs at the five Exemplar
Companies at the time their companies granted them
additional equity awards at the beginning of 2014. The table
also compares the total equity holdings of each CEO both to
the 2014 equity grants and to total 2014 compensation. To
help explain the differences between CEOs, the table also
provides the approximate date that each took office.

One way to measure the incentive value of wealth is by
calculating its sensitivity to changes in stock price. For
example, the median CEO in [the table] stands to gain
roughly $193,000 in wealth if the stock price increases 1
percent, $9.9 million if the stock price increases 50 percent,
and $20.3 million if the stock price doubles. These dollar
amounts give considerable incentive to perform.
LARCKER & TAYAN, GOVERNANCE MATTERS, supra note 25, at 247–48.
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TABLE 4.

Company
(CEO)

NSC
(Moorman)
Intel
(Krzanich)
Chevron
(Watson)

Total Equity
Value
Owned by
CEO When
Grants
Made,
2014183
$50,115,175
$8,236,781
$52,130,428

Reported Value
(Cost to
Company) of
Equity Awards
to CEO, 2014
(multiples of
total equity
over yearly
equity
awards)184
$7,504,398187
(6.68)
$6,658,700190
(1.24)
$13,402,740193
(3.89)

Reported Value
(Cost to
Company) of
Total
Compensation to
CEO, 2014
(multiples of
total equity over
total yearly
compensation)185
$13,536,017188
(3.70)
$11,197,400191
(.74)
$25,970,417194
(2.01)

Date
When
CEO
Took
Office186

Nov.
2005189
May
2013192
2010195

183 Shares held outright and vested, in-the-money options. The Los
Angeles Office of Analysis Group calculated all figures in this column
based on company SEC filings. All calculations are on file with author.
184 Computed by dividing the number in the column “Total Equity
Value Owned by CEO When Grants Made” by the number in this column.
185 Computed by dividing the number in the column “Total Equity
Value Owned by CEO When Grants Made” by the number in this column.
186 This column reports the time at which the individual became the
CEO and does not add any subsequent date on which the individual
became board chair.
187 NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 62 (sum of Stock
Awards and Options Awards columns in Summary Compensation Table).
188 Id.
189 Id. at 13.
190 Intel 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 14, at 53.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 11.
193 Chevron 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 18, at 44 (sum of Stock
Awards and Option Awards columns in Summary Compensation Table).
194 Id.
195 Id. at 10.
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Company
(CEO)

J&J
(Gorsky)
JPM
(Dimon)

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Total Equity
Value
Owned by
CEO When
Grants
Made,
2014183
$13,909,497
$366,276,046

Reported Value
(Cost to
Company) of
Equity Awards
to CEO, 2014
(multiples of
total equity
over yearly
equity
awards)184
$13,635,519196
(1.02)
$11,100,000199
(33.00)

Reported Value
(Cost to
Company) of
Total
Compensation to
CEO, 2014
(multiples of
total equity over
total yearly
compensation)185
$24,989,306197
(0.56)
$20,000,000200
(18.31)

[Vol. 2017

Date
When
CEO
Took
Office186

Apr.
2012198
Dec. 31,
2005201

Note that the value of the options, restricted stock, and
performance shares being granted in 2014 to each of the
executives was contingent equity and had—for the CEOs—
almost assuredly less value than the companies reported as
cost, for all the reasons set out in Section III.B.2. The CEOs
most likely also discounted the shares that they held
outright and their vested in-the-money options to some
extent due to impediments to selling company stock. Most
public companies impose stock ownership requirements on
their CEO, mandating that the CEO continuously hold
common stock in some amount described (i) as shares with
an aggregate value equaling some multiple of the CEO’s
salary, or (ii) as a fixed number of shares, or (iii) as an

196 J&J 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 16, at 54 (sum of Stock
Awards and Option Awards columns in Summary Compensation Table).
197 Id.
198 Id. at 18.
199 JPM 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 20, at 44, 49. Table 4 uses
this figure instead of the figure in the Summary Compensation Table
because the equity figures in the Summary Compensation Table included
some 2013 compensation due to the timing of awards. Id. at 58 n.5 to Sum.
Comp. Tbl.
200 Id. at 49 (using number from this page rather than the total
number in the Summary Compensation Table for the reason stated in the
previous note).
201 Id. at 13.
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amount determined by some other formula.202 Companies
take this step in order to ensure that executives do not sell
all their company stock and thereby sever the alignment of
their interests with the interests of other shareholders.203
NSC, for example, required Mr. Moorman to own shares with
a value equal to at least five times his annual cash salary.204
Intel required its CEO to own a minimum of 250,000
shares.205 Chevron required its CEO to own shares worth five
times his cash salary,206 and J&J mandated that its top
officer own stock worth six times salary.207 JPM imposed the
most onerous holding rule, requiring that the CEO own a
minimum of 1,000,000 shares and that, as additional
restricted shares vest, he keep 75% of them.208 Moreover,
insider trading law prohibited each of the chief executives
from selling shares whenever they possessed material
nonpublic information.209

See, e.g., EQUILAR, EXECUTIVE STOCK OWNERSHIP GUIDELINES
REPORT 6 (2013) (“The prevalence of Fortune 100 companies with publiclydisclosed stock ownership policies for executives increased from 86.3% in
2011 to 89.4% in 2012.”); id. at 8 (noting “[t]he most common guideline
structure, used by 82.3% of companies with ownership guidelines in 2012,
defines target ownership levels as a multiple of base salary” and
describing other formulae, with the second most prevalent being a fixed
number of shares).
203 Id. at 4 (“When shareholders invest in a company, they want to
make sure that the interests of the leadership team are aligned with their
own. One aspect of this is making sure that the leadership team has a
financial stake in the company. . . . However, if an executive sells most of
his or her shares upon the vesting of the awards, that individual’s tangible
alignment with shareholder interests may decrease. One way to make sure
that executives have a stake in company performance is by introducing
some form of share ownership policy . . . .”)
204 NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 48.
205 Intel 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 14, at 50.
206 Chevron 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 18, at 42.
207 J&J 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 16, at 34, 50.
208 JPM 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 20, at 53.
209 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226–29 (1980)
(recognizing that section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act imposes on
corporate insiders with material nonpublic information a duty to disclose
202
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Even taking all of this into account—that the CEOs
would discount the contingent equity off the amount
reported by the company and also discount the market value
of their shares held outright and their vested in-the-money
options—the figures in Table 4 provide an important insight.
Some of these CEOs—but not all—owned so much equity
(through stock owned outright and vested, in-the-money
options) that the effect of their decisions on the price of that
already-owned equity almost certainly would have a greater
impact on their individual wealth than the effect of those
decisions on the contingent equity in the 2014 compensation
packages.
For example, at the beginning of 2014, Mr. Moorman was
undoubtedly more concerned about the effect of his decisions
on the $50,115,175 of NSC equity that he already owned
than on the $7,504,398 in contingent equity that NSC
awarded him at that time. Similarly, Mr. Dimon was
undoubtedly more concerned about the effect of his decisions
on the $366,276,046 of JPM equity that he already owned
than on the $11,100,000 of contingent equity JPM awarded
to him for 2014. Put another way and focusing on the
incentive power of contingent equity awards, the 2014 award
to Mr. Moorman did not further encourage him to make
decisions favorable to NSC shareholders beyond the
encouragement provided by the $50,115,175 equity stake he
already held. Similarly, the 2014 contingent equity award to
Mr. Dimon did not add any incentive to make decisions
designed to increase the JPM share price that his existing
$366,276,046 equity stake did not already provide.
Indeed, when the CEO holds as much equity as Mr.
Dimon—more than eighteen times his entire 2014
compensation—it is hard to see how any of the 2014
that information or refrain from trading). Executives can work around this
limitation by creating, at a time when they do not have material inside
information, plans that put future sales on automatic pilot by sales
according to pre-set formulae or discretionary sales by money managers
over whom the executives exercise no control. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)
(2017).
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compensation would much affect his decision making, which
would be dominated by his enormous equity stake. The same
may have been true for Mr. Moorman—whose existing equity
stake was 3.7 times his entire 2014 compensation—though
this speculation is less compelling than for Mr. Dimon.
But note that the effect of already-held equity on the
efficacy of annual contingent equity awards varies from CEO
to CEO. Thus, while Mr. Moorman’s existing equity stake
was worth 6.68 times the reported value of his contingent
equity awards for 2014 and Mr. Dimon’s existing stake was
worth thirty-three times his contingent equity award for that
year, the existing equity stakes owned by Mr. Krzanich at
Intel and Mr. Gorsky at J&J were, respectively, only 1.24
and 1.02 times each of those executive’s 2014 contingent
equity awards. Therefore, the 2014 awards to them provided
incentives that were not swamped by their holdings before
the awards were made.
Mr. Krzanich and Mr. Gorsky were in this different
position because, at the beginning of 2014, both of them were
relatively new to their CEO positions, having ascended to
their posts in May 2013 and April 2012, respectively.210 By
contrast, Mr. Moorman and Mr. Dimon had been in their
positions since late 2005.211
All of this suggests that a company that does not
consider, before making a new equity award to its CEO, the
amount of equity the CEO already owns—both in absolute
terms and in comparison to the new equity award
contemplated—risks paying in a currency that will provide
no marginal motivation. It suggests as well that a company
making equity awards annually over several years of a
CEO’s tenure—and forcing the executive to keep a large
amount of that equity—risks, as the years go by, awarding
equity that provides progressively weaker incentives.

210 See Intel 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 14, at 11; J&J 2015
Proxy Statement, supra note 16, at 18; see also supra Table 3.
211 See NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 13; JPM 2015
Proxy Statement, supra note 20, at 13; see also supra Table 3.
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4. Total Individual Wealth
The last subpart makes the point that the differing
amounts of equity that CEOs hold in their companies affect
the motivating power of additional contingent equity
awarded in a given year. But the relationship between pay
and the CEO’s total wealth—not just that consisting of
company equity but all of the CEO’s wealth—is also
important to compensation decisions.
CEOs are very highly paid, as the total compensation
figures in Table 4 attest.212 Particularly after occupying the
top position for many years, a CEO’s individual wealth may
increase very considerably. Not only will the CEO likely
accumulate wealth in the form of company equity, but he or
she also may save or invest the cash received in
compensation, and may sell some of the equity received and
save or invest the cash proceeds from those sales. The CEO
may therefore invest in all kinds of assets—stocks issued by
other companies, bonds, real estate, and interests in
partnerships or limited liability companies. This wealth, too,
may grow over time. CEOs may also inherit assets. In short,
CEOs may become rich.
If they are rich, it may be harder to motivate them
through compensation, regardless of the form that
compensation takes. As an example, paying $5 million in
contingent compensation (cash or equity or any combination)
to an individual with a total net worth of $3 million may
motivate considerably. But paying $5 million in contingent
compensation to an individual with $200 million in net worth
may motivate little or not at all. The theoretical statement of
this instinctual truth is that the marginal utility of each
additional dollar from compensation declines with the total

212 See also LARCKER & TAYAN, GOVERNANCE MATTERS, supra note 25,
at 222 (showing median compensation at 100 of the largest U.S. companies
in 2013–14 at $13,713,000, and median compensation at the next largest
400 companies at $10,656,000).
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number of dollars the individual already has.213 Such
theoretical analysis suggests that, in considering the amount
needed to incentivize, it may make more sense to think of
incentive compensation equaling some percentage of the
CEO’s total wealth, rather than to think of it as equal to an
absolute dollar amount.214 That leads quickly to the thought
that, as the CEO’s wealth grows, so does the amount needed
to motivate.
A company that fails to learn its CEO’s total wealth and
consider whether the pay the company is prepared to offer
will incentivize in light of that wealth, risks paying a lot, but
not enough to affect top officer decisions. And a company
that pays large amounts to its CEO over many years risks
making the CEO so wealthy that the pay the company can
afford will motivate no longer. In this sense again, it is
foolish for a company to construct CEO pay without
considering the particular circumstances of the man or
woman at the top.

IV. HOW TO ENCOURAGE RATIONALITY
The previous Part demonstrates that a company risks
grave error when it designs a large, complex CEO
compensation package, heavy on contingent equity, without
learning and taking into account key individual traits and
financial circumstances, which could include:
•

The degree to which the CEO believes that he or
she can confidently predict a straight line from his
or her decisions through the multiple metrics and
equity vehicles in the pay package to personal
economic rewards;

213 JOACHIM WEIMANN ET AL., MEASURING HAPPINESS: THE ECONOMICS
WELL-BEING 118 (2015) (referring to “the diminishing effect of absolute
income changes . . . .”).
214 See id. (suggesting that “it isn’t the absolute change in income”
that affects life satisfaction “but the percentage change in income”).

OF
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The degree to which the CEO usefully
concentrates on manifold goals, some of which
provide only a small reward;
The CEO’s risk aversion in his or her personal
financial affairs;
The accumulated equity that the CEO owns, both
in absolute amounts and in comparison with a
contemplated grant of additional contingent
equity;
Whether the CEO applies a hyper-discount rate to
future economic rewards; and
The CEO’s total wealth.

Since companies do not take such critical facts into
account now, this Part turns to legal reforms that would
encourage them to do so. The reforms fall into two categories:
substantive reform through state law and disclosure reform
through federal law.
Before describing them, however, it is important to
emphasize that this Article proposes a true sea change in
compensation.
It
argues
that
companies
should
systematically take into account a whole new set of factors to
which they do not now pay attention in an organized and
determined way. Since this Article proposes this revolution
at publicly traded firms that have enormous impact on the
nation’s economy and since the conventional wisdom is that
the incentive compensation currently paid to CEOs vitally
affects the success and direction of these key parts of
America’s economic engine, considerable restraint is in
order.
The transition of academic theory and empirical research
to widespread application in the real world will likely be
difficult. Each compensation committee will have to satisfy
itself that it can obtain reasonably accurate information on
the relevant psychological characteristics of its CEO, and his
or her unique financial circumstances. It must determine the
extent to which it will probe the privacy of its CEO in order
to obtain this information. It must conclude that, once
discovered, this information will contribute to the creation of
better compensation packages and that the company can
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communicate that improvement to shareholders in a
meaningful way that still protects CEO privacy.
Shareholders, too, will have to adjust to the inclusion of
these new factors in compensation design.
All of this will take time, and the manner in which it is
accomplished will evolve. Some companies will move more
quickly than others. Different companies will experiment
with different techniques to measure and weight different
psychological factors. Some companies may decide that the
existing infrastructure—both inside the company and at
compensation consultants—is insufficiently robust to
incorporate any of these factors yet. Moreover, the problems
created by some individual variables—such as a CEO’s total
wealth dwarfing his or her compensation to such an extent
that the compensation incentives have no significant
economic effect on decision-making—can be recognized, but
not “solved.”
Accordingly, the reforms below allow companies a
substantial range of freedom. The reforms require attention
to the individual personality and circumstances of a CEO but
do not demand that a compensation committee proceed
doggedly through a checklist. Still less do they contemplate
some rigid grid mandating that a compensation committee
score a CEO on each of several specified personality and
financial factors, then look for the box on the grid containing
the ideal compensation scheme.
So, an imposed revolution on public companies, yes. But
one without dogma. And the companies fill in the details
themselves.

A. State Reform of the Duty of Care
The independent directors at each public company
CEO pay, with the compensation committee taking
lead.215 Each director participating in decisions made by
full board, and each director participating in decisions by
compensation committee, owes a duty of care to
215

See supra notes 73 and 74 and accompanying text.

set
the
the
the
the
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corporation.216 The law of the state in which the company is
incorporated defines that duty.217 In broad brush, “[t]he duty
of care requires that directors ‘use that amount of care which
ordinarily careful and prudent men [and women] would use
in similar circumstances.’”218 As a practical matter and
assuming that the directors will not personally benefit from
a decision, the business judgment rule protects directors
from personal liability for violating the duty of care when
making a decision unless they commit gross negligence in
collecting and considering the information that is reasonably
available and relevant to that decision.219 By employing this
standard, courts avoid second-guessing business judgments
and focus on the process by which boards reach a decision,
rather than the wisdom of the actual choice, with the
exception that the duty of care prohibits extreme substantive
decisions that cannot conceivably benefit the corporation and
effectively constitute waste.220
Directors can virtually ensure that they satisfy their duty
of care, as applied through the business judgment rule, if
they make a decision after advice from an expert. Thus,
Delaware General Corporation Law section 141(e) provides
that,
[a] member of the board of directors, or a member of
any committee designated by the board of directors,
shall, in the performance of such member’s duties, be
fully protected in relying in good faith upon . . .
216 See ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING
CORPORATE LAW §§ 8.01, 8.01[A], 8.03, 8.03[A], 8.03[B] (4th ed. 2013).
217 Id. § 1.09.
218 EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL
CORPORATION LAW: FUNDAMENTALS § 141.02[A][1] (2016) (quoting In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d,
906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006)).
219 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812–13 (Del. 1984), rev’d on other
grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253–54 (Del. 2000).
220 See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–
68 (Del. Ch. 1996); see also Binks v. DSL.net, Inc., C.A. No. 2823-VCN,
2010 WL 1713629, at *5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2010); In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006).
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any . . . person as to matters the member reasonably
believes are within such other person’s professional
or expert competence and who has been selected with
reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation.221

If the directors consult an expert, it is highly unlikely that
their decision-making process is grossly negligent.
All of these general rules apply to directors as they make
compensation decisions, as shown by the case against the
directors of the Walt Disney Company (“Disney”). The
plaintiff shareholders asserted that the Disney directors
violated their duty of care in hiring Michael Ovitz as
president of the company by an employment agreement that,
as it turned out, granted him a severance valued at $130
million after a non-fault termination only fourteen months
into his tenure.222 Invoking the business judgment rule, the
directors won the case, in part because directly or indirectly
they relied on advice from a compensation consultant.223
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2017).
The Walt Disney case produced three important published
opinions. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) affirmed in part and
reversed in part rulings of the trial court on motions to dismiss. In re Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005) granted
judgment to the defendants after a trial on all claims that the court in
Brehm did not dismiss. In re Disney, 906 A.2d at 35, affirmed that
judgment after trial. For the express application of the general principles
set out in text at supra notes 218–221 to hiring Ovitz by an employment
agreement with the rich severance package, see Brehm, 746 A.2d at 258–
64, In re Disney, 907 A.2d at 745–50, 760–771, and In re Disney, 906 A.2d
at 51–62.
223 In re Disney, 907 A.2d at 702–03 (the chair of the Disney
compensation committee (Russell) took the lead in negotiating the
employment agreement with Ovitz); id. at 704–05 (Russell and one other
member of the Disney compensation committee (Watson) worked with a
compensation consultant (Crystal) to analyze the agreement with Ovitz,
with Crystal and Watson preparing spreadsheets to value the agreement);
id. at 763–65 (Russell did not violate his duty of care because he had
extensive information—from his negotiations with Ovitz over the
agreement and his analyses with Watson and Crystal—and so was not
“grossly negligent (in that he failed to inform himself of all material
information reasonably available in making [the] decision”); id. at 765
(Watson did not violate his duty of care because he “conducted extensive
221
222
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Delaware courts could work a simple but highly effective
reform by holding that the individual characteristics of a
CEO—including such characteristics as the CEO’s appetite
or distaste for complexity in pay, his or her risk aversion in
personal finances, the proportion of the CEO’s wealth tied up
in company equity, and the total amount of the CEO’s
wealth—can constitute reasonably available information
relevant to the construction of a CEO’s pay package. Under
such a holding, a compensation committee, in order to satisfy
its duty of care, would have to collect and consider that type
of information or at least reach a reasoned conclusion that it
could not reliably or usefully do so. Such a holding—by the
Delaware courts alone—would effectively require the
majority of public companies to collect and consider such
vital information, or deliberately decide against that step,
because more than 66% of all publicly traded companies in
the United States are incorporated in Delaware224 and
therefore must apply Delaware law to their directors.225
Boards of companies incorporated in other states might well

analyses of Ovitz’s proposed compensation package, sharing those
analyses with Crystal and Russell” at a meeting and discussions with
them after that meeting, and because he participated in determining a
particular change in the options granted to Ovitz that occurred before the
committee vote on the agreement); id. at 765–80 (the other two members
of the compensation committee did not violate their duty of care in part
because, by being briefed by Russell and Watson before voting, they “relied
on the information, opinions, reports and statements made by Crystal,
even if Crystal did not relay the information, opinions, reports and
statements in person to the committee as a whole”); see also In re Disney,
906 A.2d at 59 (noting that Watson and Russell related the substance of
Crystal’s analysis and information to the compensation committee, which
therefore was protected by Del. Code § 141(e)).
224 About
Agency, Division of Corporations, ST. DELAWARE,
https://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml
[https://perma.cc/ZN7RU9WX] (last visited May 22, 2017).
225 See supra note 217; In re MS55, Inc., Civil Action No. 10–cv–
00042–PAB, 2011 WL 1084967, at *5 (D. Colo. Mar. 21, 2011); Randy J.
Holland, Delaware’s Business Courts: Litigation Leadership, 34 J. CORP. L.
771, 779–82 (2009).

FISHER –FINAL

No. 2:599]

TO THINE OWN CEO BE TRUE

669

follow suit, because courts outside Delaware frequently find
Delaware corporate law decisions persuasive.226
The directors at a company would violate this duty only if
they committed gross negligence in assembling data on their
CEO. Since Part III suggests that there is no one magic
formula to follow in tailoring compensation to, for example,
estimates of a CEO’s uncertainty aversion and risk aversion,
this duty should not weigh too heavily on directors. Boards
could effectively protect themselves from duty of care
liability by employing experts. Compensation consultants
could almost certainly expand their staffs and capabilities to
supply such expertise.
Moreover, the loose “gross negligence” standard would
permit creative experimentation.227 Thus, as boards adjust to
the new requirement that compensation take into account
how individual CEOs value and react to different
compensation schemes, different boards might safely take
different approaches. Some boards might deem some
characteristics more important than others. Some boards
might well conclude that any attempt to continue to finetune compensation by using multiple metrics and equity
vehicles is too speculative to pursue in light of the
complicating factors of individual psychology. Some boards
might decide that psychological factors beyond those
discussed in this Article are important to compensation.228
226 See Brian R. Cheffins, Delaware and the Transformation of
Corporate Governance, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 25–28 (2015).
227 See Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the
Director’s Duty of Attention, 39 BUS. L. 1477, 1491 (“The heart of the
business judgment rule has always been a recognition by the courts that
business
decisions
should
not
be
evaluated
retrospectively . . . . Sophisticated modern courts further explicitly
recognize that the private sector entrepreneurial process cannot operate
unless managers are given the latitude to be innovative and experimental
and, therefore, to make mistakes.”).
228 For example, one unpublished paper argues that deft use of cash
bonuses can help a company get the most out of a narcissistic CEO. Eric de
Bodt et al., The Equilibrium Assignment of Narcissistic CEOs to Firms
21–22 (Aug. 31, 2015) (on file with author).
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But a board could not simply ignore individualized
analysis—without at least seriously considering whether this
is the best path—because doing so would be grossly
negligent, even if an expert advised a board that unstudied
ignorance of these variables is the wisest course.229
Alternatively, Delaware courts could eschew a hard-andfast duty-of-care rule and state only that the consideration of
the CEO’s individual characteristics is a “best practice” in
compensation decision-making. The Delaware Supreme
Court took this tack in the Disney litigation. It held that the
directors had a legally sufficient grip on the severance
package granted to Ovitz at the time they approved his
employment agreement, even though they did not have a
specific calculation of the severance he ultimately received.230
But in the course of its analysis, the court added that “[i]n a
‘best case’ scenario, all [compensation] committee members
would have received, before or at the committee’s first
meeting [on the contract] . . . a spreadsheet or similar
document prepared by (or with the assistance of) a
compensation expert . . . disclos[ing] the amounts that Ovitz
could receive under the [employment agreement] in each
circumstance that might reasonably arise”—including “the
cost to Disney of a non-fault termination for each of the five

229 See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 262 (stating that a shareholder
plaintiff in a derivative case can survive a motion to dismiss where an
expert has advised the board in its decision-making process by alleging
particularized facts that, if proved, would show that a subject matter (in
this case the severance cost calculation) that was material and reasonably
available was so obvious that the board’s failure to consider it was grossly
negligent regardless of the expert’s advice). By providing this example,
this Article does not mean to suggest that compensation committees
should start with the notion that they will take an elaborate psychological
inventory of their CEO and use the results to fine-tune already complex
schemes. The critical characteristics identified by the research
summarized above are few and relatively simple—percent of total wealth
consisting of company equity, risk aversion, uncertainty aversion, and
discount rate applied to future returns.
230 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 56–58 (Del.
2006).
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years of the initial term.”231 As a foreseeable and practical
result of this passage, compensation consultants and lawyers
advised clients to prepare “tally sheets” showing termination
payments.232 Similarly, if the Delaware courts were to
identify, as a “best practice,” express consideration of such
factors as the amenability of the CEO to pay complexity, the
discount that the CEO applies to contingent equity
compensation, and the effect of the top executive’s total
wealth on the company’s ability to incentivize by economic
rewards, just that admonition could cause compensation
committees to explicitly take such factors into account.

B. Federal Reform of Compensation Disclosure
Each public company must file a Form 10-K each year233
and must file with the SEC and distribute to shareholders a
federally prescribed proxy statement when soliciting proxies
from shareholders for meetings, including director

Id. at 56.
See Client Letter from Frederic W. Cook & Co., Inc., Landmark
Disney Decision Provides Guidance for Compensation Governance (July
28, 2006), http://www.fwcook.com/content/Documents/Publications/7-2806_Landmark_Disney_Decision_Provides.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8HJ4PG3H]; Client Update from Perkins Coie LLP, Delaware Supreme Court’s
Disney Decision Affirms the Business Judgment Rule and Endorses
Compensation Committee Best Practices—“Quantify. Discuss. Document.”
(June 21, 2006), https://www.perkinscoie.com/en/ news-insights/delawaresupreme-court-s-disney-decision-affirms-the-business.html
[https://perma.cc/H844-8J3G]. The Disney litigation was not, however,
alone in focusing board attention on the details of termination payments.
In 2006, the SEC overhauled the executive compensation disclosure rules.
Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Final Rule, 71
Fed. Reg. 53,158 (Sept. 8, 2006). The new rules, id. at 53,250, 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.402(j) (2017), require identification of any circumstances triggering
payments on termination and, for each circumstance, require the company
to describe and quantify the payments.
233 Companies with securities registered under section 12 must file
annual reports on the form prescribed by the SEC. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1
(2017). The SEC prescribes Form 10-K as the default form for annual
reports. 17 C.F.R. § 249.310(a) (2017).
231
232
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elections.234 SEC rules require public companies to disclose
executive compensation in both their Form 10-K and proxy
statements.235 Companies typically provide the executive
compensation disclosure in their proxy statements and
incorporate that disclosure into their Forms 10-K by
reference.236
The compensation disclosure is extraordinarily farreaching and detailed. A summary table lists all categories of
compensation that the company paid to its five NEOs in the
preceding year and the dollar amounts in each category paid
to each executive.237 Where the amount of the compensation
is fixed—as is true of the salary paid for the year and the
annual bonus actually awarded for the year—the company
must disclose the amount paid.238 Where the compensation
takes the form of equity, such as awards of restricted stock
or options or performance shares, the company must disclose
the cost to the company according to accounting rules.239

15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(1) (2012).
Form 10-K Part III, Item 11 (2012) (requiring the information in
Item 402 of Regulation S-K (17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2017))); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-101 (Schedule 14A) Item 8(a) (2017) (same).
236 Form 10-K, General Instruction G(3) (2012) (“The information
required by Part III (Items 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14) may be incorporated by
reference from the registrant’s definitive proxy statement.”).
237 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(c) (2017).
238 The salary and annual bonus to be paid to an NEO based on the
results from year one would normally be paid to that officer before the
company files its proxy statement in year two, or is calculable by that
time. If not, the company must so explain in a footnote to the summary
compensation table and must later file a Form 8-K to disclose the dollar
amount of salary or bonus when it is calculated. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402
Instruction 1 to 402(c)(2)(iii) and (iv) (2017).
239 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(c) (2017) requires companies to provide a
summary compensation table for the NEOs. The regulation requires
separate columns for (i) stock awards, including restricted stock and
performance shares, and (ii) stock options—in each case reporting
“aggregate grant date fair value computed in accordance with FASC ASC
Topic 718.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(c)(v), (vi) (2017). The PWC publication
setting out the rules governing the computation of that value, supra notes
150–156 and accompanying text, elaborates that ASC Topic.
234
235
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But the disclosures go further. They include a table
showing the estimated future payouts of equity and nonequity incentive plans.240 All outstanding options, executive
by executive, held at the end of the preceding year—both
vested and unvested, with exercise prices and expiration
dates—appear in a different table, which also reports all
other unvested equity shares.241 Yet another table sets out,
NEO by NEO, the number of shares acquired in the
preceding year by exercising options and vesting of stock
awards and the realized value of the exercise or vesting.242
Other tables show the pension benefits for each of the NEOs,
including the actuarial present value of accumulated
benefits;243 each one’s deferred compensation, including
withdrawals during the preceding year and balances at the
end of the year;244 the amounts of compensation and types of
compensation to which each NEO would be entitled if the
company were taken over;245 and the amount and nature of
company equity securities that each of the executives
owns.246 The SEC also requires that each company include a
CD&A that describes how and why it chose to compensate
the executives as it did.247
Although extensive, none of the existing rules requires
that the company describe how, or even whether, the
company’s compensation committee considered the CEO’s
personal characteristics or financial condition in creating the
CEO’s pay package. True, the regulations require disclosures
that, if plucked out and organized differently, would permit
shareholders to analyze the relationship between some
individualized factors—such as the size of contingent equity
240 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(d) (2017). The table includes for each of the
NEOs the threshold, target, and maximum dollar and share payouts. Id.
241 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(f) (2017).
242 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(g) (2017).
243 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(h) (2017).
244 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(i) (2017).
245 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(t) (2017).
246 17 C.F.R. § 229.403(b) (2017).
247 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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awards in a yearly pay package in relation to the total equity
that a CEO owns outright or holds in the form of vested, inthe-money options. But the rules do not require report of, for
example, any data that shareholders could use to reliably
compute the CEO’s total wealth or reaction to compensation
complexity.
The SEC could close this gap. Currently, regulations
require CD&As in proxy statements248 and include (i) a list of
seven items that a CD&A “shall” address,249 and (ii) a list of
fifteen items that it “may” address.250 The SEC could add the
following to the first list, thereby mandating that each
company disclose: “(viii) how the company integrated the
individual characteristics and financial circumstances of its
CEO into the compensation decisions for that officer.”251
Since this is only a disclosure requirement rather than a
substantive one, a company could respond to this
requirement by reporting that it did not integrate such
considerations into its CEO compensation decisions at all.
For that reason, the rule might most usefully be written to
permit such a response, but to require a company selecting
this path to explain why it did not consider such information.
Thus the SEC could add to the words suggested above: “and,
if the company did not collect and consider such individual
characteristics and circumstances in determining the
compensation of its CEO, why the company did not do so.”
The federal government has used such phrasing before to
effectively push companies to take a step that a law or
regulation seeks to promote, counting on companies’ aversion

248 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 Item 8 (2017), requiring disclosure of all
information specified by 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2017) in a proxy statement
seeking authority to vote shares at a public company in an election of
directors, with the CD&A specified in 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b) (2017).
249 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b)(1) (2017).
250 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b)(2) (2017).
251 The regulation calls the company “the registrant.” This Article
substituted the word “company” for readability. Similarly, the regulation
refers to a company’s “principal executive officer.” This Article substituted
“CEO.”

FISHER –FINAL

No. 2:599]

TO THINE OWN CEO BE TRUE

675

to the public embarrassment of explaining why they have not
done what the law or regulation presumes to be desirable.
For example, Sarbanes-Oxley Act section 407 required the
SEC to issue regulations requiring public companies to
disclose “whether or not, and if not, the reasons therefor, the
audit committee . . . is comprised of at least 1 member who is
a financial expert, as such term is defined by the
Commission.”252 The SEC adopted this rule253 and required
public companies to comply beginning in either 2003 or 2004,
depending on the size of the company and the calendar year
date on which its fiscal year ended.254 A decade later,
virtually all large public companies had at least one director
on their audit committees who was an “audit committee
financial expert,” and a majority had more than one.255 This
experience suggests that the SEC requirement this Article
proposes—although phrased only as a disclose-or-explain
mandate—has a high probability of moving companies to
incorporate CEO personal characteristics and circumstances
into their CEO compensation decisions.256 Almost certainly,
it would cause companies to at least consider whether they

252 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 407, 116 Stat.
745, 790 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7265 (2012)).
253 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(d)(5)(i) (2017). The qualifications for an “audit
committee financial expert” appear at 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(d)(ii) and (iii)
(2017).
254 Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 5110, 5110 (Jan. 31, 2003).
255 DELOITTE, CURRENT TRENDS IN AUDIT COMMITTEE REPORTING 1
(2015) (based on then most recent proxy statements of companies in the
S&P 100); id. at 2 (“Every company covered by our analysis disclosed that
it had at least one financial expert, and 76 percent [had] more than one
financial expert.”).
256 See Eric Alden, Blocking the Ax: Shielding Corporate Counsel from
Retaliation as an Alternative to White Collar Hypercriminalization, 36 U.
HAW. L. REV. 95, 151 n.178 (pointing to the audit committee financial
expert regulation as an example of shaming disclosures that have proven
effective in inducing changes in corporate behavior and stating “[d]esirous
of avoiding [an] embarrassing disclosure, public companies generally
strive to find audit committee financial experts whenever possible”).
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should tailor pay to the personality and personal finances of
their top officers.
The rule proposed should be interpreted to permit
companies to identify what individual characteristics and
financial factors the company took into account, without
providing additional specifics. Thus a company could report
that it took its CEO’s total wealth into account in creating
his or her pay package without revealing the amount of that
wealth, or its composition. Similarly, a company could
disclose that it took into consideration the risk aversion of its
CEO in personal financial affairs without revealing any
measurement of that aversion. The CEO’s privacy could
remain intact. A majority of companies probably would
choose this path.

C. Whether the Reforms Are Fair
While these proposed reforms are useful, it is important
to consider whether they are fair. In particular, are the
reforms fair to CEOs? And are the reforms fair to
shareholders?
Bluntly, the reforms propose that each compensation
committee analyze the psyche of its CEO. The CEO might
consider this an unfair invasion. But more than likely, he or
she would not. Corporate America uses psychological testing
widely today and has for many years. The American
Management Association found in a 1999 survey that 46% of
employers used some form of psychological testing.257 In
2013, 57% of large U.S. companies used pre-hire assessments
that included tests probing for personality traits as well as
technical skills.258 Far from restricting psychological
257 American Management Association, 1999 AMA Survey on
Workplace Testing, MGMT. REV., July-Aug. 1999, at 44, 46.
258 Lauren Weber, Today’s Personality Tests Raise the Bar for Job
Seekers,
WALL
S T.
J.
(Apr.
14,
2015,
11:13
PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-personality-test-could-stand-in-the-way-ofyour-next-job-1429065001.html [https://perma.cc/6WLH-UXAK]; see also
Lauren Weber & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Are Workplace Personality Tests
Fair?, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2014, 10:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
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evaluations to new hires for lower-level positions, companies
administer such tests to top executive aspirants as well.259 A
survey of 82 predominantly large U.S. companies in 2013
found that 39 gave personality tests to “high potential”
employees and 34 to “senior executives.”260 Even aspiring
CEO candidates can find themselves scrutinized by headdoctors before hiring.261 Thus, while the particular mindprobing this Article suggests may be new to CEOs, they will
not find novel the notion that their companies take a
psychological inventory that affects their careers. And if
most companies choose to disclose only the fact that they are
considering results of personality tests and investigations of
financial circumstances—without also disclosing the results

articles/are-workplace-personality-tests-fair-1412044257 [https://perma.cc/
3FTX-8L4C].
259 Joann S. Lublin, Employers Put Executive Job Candidates to the
Test, WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2011, 2:41 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052748703730804576319231860529442
[https://perma.cc/
LN6D-N9F8].
260 Allan H. Church & Christopher T. Rotolo, How Are Top Companies
Assessing Their High-Potential and Senior Executives? A Talent
Management Benchmark Study, 65 CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY J.: PRAC. &
RES. 199, 204–05, 207 (2013) (describing 95 companies from which
responses sought and reporting that responses came back from individuals
at 84). The survey showed that 59 of the 84 used “assessments” for “highpotential” employees (defined as employees “below the VP level who [are]
seen as having the capability to progress into leadership positions two or
more levels beyond their current role”) or “senior executives” (defined as
“leaders in the mid- to upper leadership levels in the organization (e.g.,
Vice President and above), regardless of whether they are considered highpotential or not”). Id. at 206–07. Among those employing assessments,
66% (or 39) used “personality inventories” for assessing high-potentials
and 57% (or 34) for assessing senior executives. Id. at 210.
261 Joanna Pachner, Why Top Companies Are Sending Their CEO
Candidates to the Psychologist, CANADIAN BUS. (Dec. 9, 2014),
http://www.canadianbusiness.com/leadership/why-top-companies-aresending-their-ceo-candidates-to-the-psychologist [https://perma.cc/4D3QHTFX]; see also Lublin, supra note 259 (describing the assessment of a
candidate for the CFO position at Becton, Dickinson & Co., which included
a long session with a psychologist and online tests for personality and
strategic thinking).
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of those tests or any of the dollar amounts of the financial
circumstances—the CEOs’ privacy will not suffer.
Moreover, if the compensation committees do their jobs
well, CEOs will be pleased with the results. Top executives
who are frustrated by complex schemes will be relieved when
they receive simpler pay packages. CEOs who are already
glutted with company equity will receive far fewer (or no)
contingent shares that they value little, but more cash that
they value much. Top executives who are particularly risk
averse in their personal financial affairs, as determined by
an analysis of their personal investment decisions in the
past, will be pleased to receive more of their incentive
payments in cash and less in contingent equity.
It is quite possible that express consideration of
personality and financial circumstances will reduce some
CEOs’ reported pay. As subpart III.B.2 shows, that objective
cost, particularly for contingent equity, may be vastly in
excess of the subjective value conveyed to the CEO. For that
reason, a company concluding that its CEO is highly risk
averse in his or her personal financial affairs and finding
that a high proportion of the CEO’s personal wealth is
already invested in company equity, may decide that it can
convey the same subjective value to its CEO by substituting,
for contingent equity, an amount of cash that is less than the
company’s cost of that equity. A drop in reported pay may
bruise a CEO’s ego even if he or she receives a pay package
with the same or more subjective value as the pay package it
replaces. That, however, is a fair price for pay rationality.
Whether the reforms are fair to shareholders is a closer
call. If the compensation committees do their jobs well,
shareholders will benefit, as the individuals running the
companies in which the investors place their money will
receive more rational remuneration. And arguably, pay
(measured by cost to the company) will decrease—at least at
those companies that are now making large, expensive
contingent equity grants to CEOs with high risk aversion
and a high percentage of their total assets in company stock.
On the other hand, if companies respect the privacy of
their top executives, they will disclose only that they are, for
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example, taking the CEO’s total wealth into account, without
disclosing that wealth. Shareholders therefore will not be
able to evaluate how well the companies are applying
individual characteristics and circumstances in determining
CEO pay, only that the companies are now considering that
data. The shareholders’ proxy advisors will find themselves
in the same position. In that sense, pay-setting will be more
opaque. But weighing the increased opacity against the
improved rationality, the balance seems fair. The theory of
the modern public corporation is that the board runs the
company, not the shareholders. Necessarily, where
operations are vast and varied and shareholders meet but
once a year, the board will be privy to facts that the
shareholders do not have.

V. CONCLUSION
Elaborate CEO compensation structures pile one type of
pay on top of another. The attention lavished on these
schemes, as well as their cost, testifies to their importance.
Yet the companies pay no heed to the personality or
circumstances of the individuals whom the schemes are
supposed to motivate. The companies concentrate instead on
abstract design. It is as though they are picking extremely
expensive suits for mannequins.
Top executive compensation should be tailored to the
individual CEO. Bespoke suits only, please.
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APPENDIX A. CEO COMPENSATION AT NSC IN
2014, REPORTED IN 2015 PROXY STATEMENT
Category
A salary

262

A yearly
grant of
restricted
stock units
(“RSUs”)263

Explanation
Cash
Each RSU grant settled five years after the date of the
grant by transferring to Mr. Moorman shares of NSC
common stock equal to the number of RSUs in the
grant.264
During the five-year vesting period, NSC paid Mr.
Moorman amounts equal to the dividend payments
made to other NSC shareholders on a number of shares
equal to the number of RSUs in the grant (“dividend
equivalent payments”).265
Because he received an RSU grant each year and
because each grant vested after five years, at any given
time Mr. Moorman had, through his RSU grants,
common stock coming to him in tranches this year, next
year, and in each of the three following years.266

NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 54, 62.
Id. at 65 (column (i) in Table titled “2014 Grants of Plan-Based
Awards”); id. 66 (explaining that column as “represent[ing] grants of
restricted stock units”).
264 Id. at 67.
265 Id.
266 At the beginning of 2015, Mr. Moorman possessed RSUs that
would, if vested, provide him with the following number of NSC shares in
each of the following years:
Date RSU
to be
1/29/15
1/27/16
1/26/17
1/24/18
1/23/19
Settled
Shares
17,500
14,000
12,000
14,000
11,950
Id. at 69.
262
263
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Explanation
A grant set a maximum number of NSC common shares
that Mr. Moorman could receive at the end of a threeyear cycle beginning when the grant is made.267
The maximum number of shares in a grant divided into
two equal parts, with the number of shares actually
transferred at the end of the three years in each of these
halves dependent on NSC’s performance along a
different variable—
First Half. The number of shares transferred depended
on the three-year average after-tax return on average
invested capital (“ROIC”),268 with a minimum of a 13%
ROIC necessary for any shares in this half to transfer
and the number of shares then increasing until all the
shares in this half are awarded if ROIC reaches 20%;269
Second Half. The number of shares transferred
depended on NSC’s total shareholder return (“TSR,”
which includes stock price appreciation and dividends)
over the entire three-year performance cycle, as
compared with the TSR at the five other publicly traded
North American Class I Railroads (“NACIRRs”) (with
0% of this half of the maximum number of shares
transferred if NSC ranked fifth or sixth among
NACIRRs in TSR, 25% transferred if NSC ranked
fourth, and an additional 25% added with each place
above fourth up to 100% if NSC’s TSR was the best
among all NACIRRs), provided that if NSC’s TSR
exceeded the median TSR for S&P 500 companies, 40%

267 Id. at 65–66 & n. to columns (f), (g) & (h); NSC 2015 10-K, supra
note 2; id. at Ex. 10.6, Norfolk Southern Corporation Long-Term Incentive
Plan Award Agreement Performance Share Units at ¶ 3 (2014)
[hereinafter 2014 NSC PSU Award Agreement]. The PSUs convert into
shares of NSC common stock at the end of the three-year cycle. Id.
268 2014 NSC PSU Award Agreement, supra note 267, at ¶ 3(b).
269 NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 57 (“Return on
average invested capital for this purpose is calculated by dividing Norfolk
Southern’s net operating profit after-tax (defined as net income excluding
interest expense, and adjusted for the effect of capitalizing Norfolk
Southern’s operating lease obligations) by the average invested capital
(defined as the average of the current and prior year-end stockholders’
equity and total debt balances, which is then adjusted for the effect of
capitalizing NSC’s operating lease obligations).”).
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Explanation
of this one-half of the shares would transfer to Mr.
Moorman regardless of NSC’s TSR rank among the
NACIRRs.270
The number of shares awarded from each one-half of the
maximum number of shares depended only on the
variable relevant to that half and was independent of
the variables governing awards from the other half.271
At any given time, Mr. Moorman was in the last year of
a three-year PSU cycle, the second-to-last year of
another cycle, and the first year of yet a third cycle.

An annual
cash
incentive
payment272

270

NSC set the criteria for an annual bonus not later than
90 days into the relevant year.273
For 2014, Mr. Moorman’s maximum bonus opportunity
was 250% of salary,274 which was $1,000,000275—so that
the total possible bonus was $2.5 million, an amount
that could be adjusted downward at the Compensation
Committee’s discretion and with the expectation that
the committee would reduce the maximum bonus
opportunity to 225% of salary or $2,250,000.276 The
amount actually awarded was a percentage of the
maximum opportunity determined by three companywide performance metrics:277 (1) NSC’s operating
income (“OI”) for 2014,278 (2) NSC’s operating ratio

Id. at 57; 2014 NSC PSU Award Agreement, supra note 267, at

¶ 3(a).
271 NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 57 (“Each half of
performance share units granted vests independently of the other half and
its respective performance metrics.”).
272 NSC called the payment an “annual incentive award” or “NonEquity Incentive Plan Compensation.” Id. at 54, 62–63.
273 Id. at app. A § 3.
274 Id. at 54.
275 Id. at 62.
276 Id. at 54.
277 Id. at 55.
278 NSC’s operating income for 2014 for the purpose of compensation
calculations equaled $3.575 billion. Id. at 56. This was the “income from
railway operations” shown on the company’s audited financial statements
for the year. NSC 2015 10-K, supra note 2, at K40. That figure equaled the
railway operating revenues minus railway operating expenses (e.g.,
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Explanation
(“OR”)279 for the year, and (3) NSC’s composite service
measure (“CSM”) for 2014 (which was “the weighted
average of adherence to operating plan, connection
performance, and train performance, with weights of
30%, 30% and 40% respectively”).280
To calculate the cash actually paid, NSC first computed
the percentage “payout” for each of the three different
performance metrics.
There was no OI payout if OI for the year fell to $2.25
billion or below. The percentage of the OI payout
increased with OIs above that amount. Thus, the OI
factor paid out 30% if OI reached $2.5 billion, 52% if OI
reached $3.05 billion, with increased percentage payouts
for larger OIs up to $3.63 billion, at or above which the
OI factor paid out 100%.281
There was no OR payout if OR for the year was 76% or
more. The percentage of the OR payout increased with
ORs below 76%. Thus the OR factor paid out 30% if the
OR fell to 74.5%, 52% if the OR fell to 71.4%, with
increased percentage payouts for lower ORs down to
69.3%, at or below which the OR factor paid out
100%.282
There was no CSM payout if CSM for the year was less
than 73%. The percentage of the CSM payout increased
with CSMs above 73%. Thus, the CSM factor paid out
30% if the CSM equaled 73%, 52% if the CSM factor
rose to 77.2%, with increased payouts for higher CSM

compensation, fuel, and depreciation). Id. Operating income did not
include interest on debt. Id.
279 Operating ratio is “a measure of the amount of operating revenues
consumed by operating expenses.” NSC 2015 10-K, supra note 2, at K21.
Those operating expenses include depreciation. Id. at K40 (which shows
total railway operating expenses, including depreciation, at $8.049 billion
and railroad operating revenue at $11.624 billion, so that the operating
ratio was 69.2%—the figure reported in the NSC 2015 Proxy Statement,
supra note 12, at 7).
280 NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 55.
281 Id. at 56.
282 Id.
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Explanation
percentages up to 82.5%, at or above which the CSM
factor paid out 100%.283
Once NSC had computed the “payout” for each of the
three factors, it then weighted those payouts 50% for OI,
35% for OR, and 15% for CSM284 and applied that final
percentage to Mr. Moorman’s downward-discretionadjusted bonus opportunity.285
The bonus was subject to a maximum so that “the
annual incentive paid to any individual executive under
the plan will not exceed the lesser of three-tenths of one
percent of NSC’s income from railway operations for the
incentive year or ten million dollars.”286
In 2014, the company results and resulting factor
payouts and weighting were as follows:
% of
Factor
Payout on
Weight
Factor
OI
$3.575
91.2%
50%
OR
69.2%
100%
35%
CSM
69.9%
0%
15%
Total Summary Percentage: 80.6%287
Factor

Performance

Subtotal
45.6%
35%
0%

At the end of the year, the Compensation Committee
exercised its discretion to reduce Mr. Moorman’s bonus
opportunity to 225% of his salary.288
Thus his actual cash bonus for 2014 was 80.6% of the
$2,250,000 = $1,813,500.289

Id.
Id. at 55.
285 Id. at 54.
286 Id. at 56.
287 Id.
288 Id. at 54.
289 Id. at 62 (Summary Compensation Table, column (g)). The
Compensation Committee had the right to reduce Mr. Moorman’s annual
cash incentive award on the basis of his individual performance (as
opposed to the performance of the company, as reflected in the metrics
used to compute the award) but determined that Mr. Moorman, like other
executives, had “met or exceeded expectations” and therefore did not
reduce his cash incentive payment. Id. at 54.
283
284
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Explanation
The exercise price for each option grant equaled the
higher of the closing price, or the average of the high
and low price, of NSC stock on the effective day of the
grant, which was the first day of the trading window in
which NSC executives could buy or sell NSC stock after
the release of NSC’s yearly financial results.290
All of the options in a grant vested four years after the
grant date.291 During the four-year vesting period, Mr.
Moorman received dividend equivalent payments for the
shares on which he had options.292 Mr. Moorman could
exercise the options in a grant at any time after the
options vested and before they expired on the tenth
anniversary of the grant.293
At any given time, Mr. Moorman had, through these
grants, the opportunity to buy stock under options that
would vest this year, next year, and each of the
following two years, as well as options that had
previously vested that he had not exercised but had not
yet expired. Since the exercise price was—for the option
award in any given year—set at the price of NSC stock

Id. at 56.
Id.
292 Id.
293 NSC states that it may grant options for a term up to 10 years
(which includes the vesting period). NSC 2015 10-K, supra note 2, at K67
n.12 to NSC and Subsidiaries Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements.
NSC states that it granted Mr. Moorman options on 87,880 shares of stock
on 1/23/2014, NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 65, and that
options on the same number of shares will expire on 1/22/2024, id. at 68,
10 years later.
290
291
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Explanation
at the time of that year’s award, the exercise prices
differed for each grant.294

294 Thus, at December 31, 2014, Mr. Moorman had options on shares
as follows:
No. of Vested
No. of Unvested
Shares
Shares
Option
Option
Underlying
Underlying
Exercise
Expiration
Unexercised
Unexercised
Price
Date
Options
Options
123,030
50.740
01/23/2018

137,500

38.705

01/28/2019

112,500

47.760

01/28/2020

83,000

62.745

01/26/2021

76,000

75.140

01/25/2022

102,000

69.830

01/23/2023

87,880
94.170
NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 68.

01/22/2024
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APPENDIX B. CEO COMPENSATION AT THE
OTHER FOUR EXEMPLAR COMPANIES IN 2014,
REPORTED IN 2015 PROXY STATEMENTS
Intel Corporation
295

Options

None

Annual cash
incentives

The Compensation Committee set incentive cash target
amount, which was then multiplied by a weighted
average percentage of three factors:
An absolute performance factor =

!"##$%&  !"#$  !"#  !"#$%&
!"#$%&'(  !"#$  !"#  !"#$%&

  

A relative performance factor =
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑙  %  𝑛𝑒𝑡  𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒  𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦  𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟  𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝  %  𝑛𝑒𝑡  𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒  𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ

An operational performance factor = the corporate
average of percentage achievement of operational
performance goals for 10 different groups, each with
three to four internal goals, for a total of 32 goals for all
groups, with scoring for an operational goal topped at
5%, and this entire percentage subject to a 5% kicker
for corporate level executives including the CEO, with
25% weight for the first factor, 25% for the second
factor, and 50% for the third factor.296

295 Intel 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 14, at 38 (“[I]n 2014 we
ceased granting stock options to our listed officers, so that all of their
equity awards are delivered in the form of variable performance-based
outperformance restricted stock units (OSUs) and restricted stock units
(RSUs), which align their compensation with the long-term interests of
Intel’s stockholders by focusing our executive officers on both absolute and
relative TSR.”).
296 Id. at 42–44, 57–59. The operational goals are a broad mix—e.g.,
“PC client billing volume,” “Innovate for future leadership: Skylake
desktop schedule,” “Launch products shown at CES,” and “Deliver
optimized Android* on Intel® architecture (IA) platforms.” Id. at 58. The
scheme also includes quarterly cash incentive payments, id. at 59, which
are relatively small ($133,000 paid to CEO for 2014, id. at 54, out of total
compensation valued at $11,197,400, id. at 53). The amount of the
quarterly payments depends on Intel’s profitability. Id. at 59. Included in
the quarterly cash incentives, Intel also pays “up to an additional two days
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Intel Corporation
Annual cash
incentives
(continued)

The Compensation Committee could adjust the
incentive payment up or down by 10% to 20% “based on
the individual’s performance to enhance the link
between individual pay and accountability.”297

Performance
shares &
metrics

The Compensation Committee set total value of annual
equity awards to NEOs, then divided this value among
the officers, with about 60% in target PSUs298 and 40%
in RSUs.299
The actual number of performance shares depended on
Intel’s TSR relative to the TSR for its technology peer
group over the three-year performance period following
the grant date of the PSUs.
Executive receives:
• 100% of target shares if Intel is within 1% of the
peer group median;
• if above the median, number of shares increases by
4% for each 1% that Intel’s TSR exceeds the median
(up to a maximum of 200% of targeted shares); and
• if below the median, number of shares decreases by
2% for each 1% that Intel’s TSR falls below the
median but executives receive no shares if Intel’s
TSR is more than 25% below the median.300
Performance stock units are settled in common stock.301
Executive is always in three different three-year
performance cycles.

of compensation for each performance year if Intel achieves its customer
satisfaction goals.” Id. at 45.
297 Id. at 43.
298 Intel calls its performance stock units “outperformance restricted
stock units” Or “OSUs.” Id. at 38. For comparison purposes and because
the OSUs are economically the same incentive tool as PSUs, the table
refers to the OSUs as PSUs.
299 Id. at 45.
300 Id. at 46.
301 Id.
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Intel Corporation
Restricted
stock

RSUs for any given award vest in approximately equal
amounts quarterly over three years.302
Executive is always in 12 vesting cycles.
RSUs may be settled in common stock unless the
compensation committee determines otherwise.303

Compensation
in equity304

59%305

Chevron Corporation
Options

Management Compensation Committee (“MCC”) set
intended grant date value for LTIP equity to CEO,306
which was then divided into 60% awarded in options
and 40% in performance shares.307
Options vest over three years, 1/3 each year.308
Options in a particular grant expire 10 years after the
grant date.309
Executive is always in three vesting cycles and up to
seven exercise cycles—with different exercise prices for
each of the relevant awards.

Annual cash
incentives

Annual cash bonus was cash salary times a target
percentage set by the MCC (e.g., 150% for the CEO in
2014)310 times a percentage Corporate Performance
Rating times an individual performance factor.311

Id.
Id. at A-7 (Intel Corporation 206 Equity Incentive Plan, As
Amended and Restated Effective May 21, 2015, § 8(b)(v)).
304 Percentages computed from summary compensation tables unless
otherwise stated.
305 Intel 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 14, at 53 (computed as
reported value of stock awards divided by reported total value of
compensation).
306 Chevron 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 18, at 40.
307 Id. at 38, 39.
308 Id. at 38.
309 Id.
310 Id. at 34, 38.
311 Id. at 34.
302
303
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Chevron Corporation
The Corporate Performance Rating was determined:
• 40% by financial factors (broken down into earnings
and earnings per share, return on capital employed
and TSR over one, three, and five years)
• 20% by health, environment, and safety (broken
down into process safety, personal safety, and
environmental performance)
• 25% by operating performance (broken down into
operating expenses, segment earnings per barrel,
production, reserves, and asset utilization rates)
• 15% by milestones and commercial (broken down
into major capital projects and commercial
transactions)312
Thus, four factors with an aggregate of 13 different
measurements.313
The individual performance factor “is largely a personal
leadership dimension, recognizing the individual effort
and initiative expended and demonstrated progress on
key business initiatives during the course of the year”
and is based on the MCC’s “judgment.”314

Performance
shares &
metrics

Target number of shares determined by the average
price of stock in 20-day period before grant date.315
Actual number of shares settled determined by
Chevron’s TSR rank over three-year performance
period, relative to the TSR for performance share peer
group consisting of Chevron and four other oil
companies.316
Executive credited with the following percentages of
the target shares, depending on Chevron’s rank in the
peer group:
1. 200%

Id. at 35.
Indeed, some of the “measures” appear to incorporate multiple
data points. For example, “Total Shareholder Return” includes measures
for one, three, and five years. Therefore, it is only one measure, but has
multiple inputs. Id. at 35.
314 Id. at 34.
315 Id. at 40 tbl. n.*, 46 tbl. n.2.
316 Id. at 38–39. That peer group consists of BP, ExxonMobil, Royal
Dutch Shell and Total. Id. at 35.
312
313
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Chevron Corporation
Performance
shares &
metrics
(continued)

2.
3.
4.
5.

150%
100%
50%
0%317

Award then settled in cash by multiplying the number
of shares credited times the 20-day trailing average
price of Chevron stock at the end of the performance
period.318
Executive is always in three performance cycles.
Restricted
stock

Company only issues RSUs “from time to time”319 and
issued none to the CEO in 2014.320

Compensation
in equity

52% (including performance shares) but 33% if only
options counted as equity321 given that the performance
share awards are settled in cash.322
Johnson & Johnson

Options

All options in any year’s grant vest at end of three
years and are exercisable thereafter until 10 years after
grant.323
Executive is always in three vesting cycles and up to
seven exercise cycles, each with a different exercise
price.

Annual cash
incentives

Annual performance bonus determined by multiplier
applied to performance bonus opportunity,324 which is

Id. at 39.
Id. at 47–49.
319 Id. at 40.
320 See the blank for Watson in the column labeled “Market Value of
Shares or Units of Stock That Have Not Vested” in the table on 47,
together with note 3 to that table. The column shows that there were RSU
awards to three other executives in 2014.
321 Chevron 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 18, at 44 (computed as
reported value of stock awards plus option awards, divided by reported
total value of compensation).
322 Id. at 38, 48 tbl. n.2.
323 J&J 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 16, at 42.
324 Id. at 47.
317
318
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Johnson & Johnson
Annual cash
incentives
(continued)

set as a percentage of salary.325
Single-year performance measures (with a range goal
for each) were
• Operational sales growth (“sales increase due to
volume and price, excluding the effect of currency
translation”)
• Free cash flow (“net cash from operating activities
less additions to property, plant, and equipment”)
• Adjusted operational earnings per share growth
(which excludes the effect of currency translation)326
The proxy suggests that other objectives also play a
role—e.g., innovation (as shown, for example, by
successful product introductions and spending 11% of
revenue on research and development); execution (as
shown by strategic divestitures and exceeding revenue
and cost synergies goals at a newly acquired business);

Id. at 41.
Id. at 32–33. Adjusted earnings per share also excludes “special
items as set forth in Exhibit 99.2O to [J&J’s] . . . Form 8-K dated January
20, 2015.” Id. at 33. That 8-K states:
325
326

The Company provides earnings before provision for taxes
on income, net earnings, net earnings per share (diluted),
and effective tax rate on an adjusted basis because
management believes that these measures provide useful
information to investors. Among other things, these
measures may assist investors in evaluating the
Company’s results of operations period over period. In
various periods, these measures may exclude such items as
significant
costs
associated
with
acquisitions,
restructuring, litigation, and changes in applicable laws
and regulations (including significant accounting or tax
matters). Special items may be highly variable, difficult to
predict, and of a size that sometimes has substantial
impact on the Company’s reported results of operations for
a period. Management uses these measures internally for
planning, forecasting and evaluating the performances of
the Company’s businesses, including allocating resources
and evaluating results relative to employee performance
compensation targets.
J&J, Current Report (Form 8-K) Exh. 99.2O n.A to tables (Jan. 20, 2015).
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Johnson & Johnson
Annual cash
incentives
(continued)

and global reach (as shown, for example, by sales
growth in both developed and emerging markets).327
Proxy does not disclose how the company weighted
these various factors in determining the multiplier.
No individual bonus to be paid unless consolidated net
earnings are positive, and no individual bonus to
exceed .08% of such earnings.328

Performance
shares &
metrics

Committee and board set target compensation and pay
mix,329 which then sets a target number of performance
shares units330 that vest over a three-year performance
period.331
The number of shares awarded depends on three
metrics:
1. 1-year operational sales for each year of the threeyear period
2. Three-year cumulative adjusted operational EPS
3. Three-year TSR versus the three-year TSR of a
composite competitor group,332 which consists of
32 companies333
Each factor separately determines how one-third of the
PSUs translate into number of shares earned (with
each single year of operational sales determining 1/3 of
the 1/3 allocated to that factor),334 with no shares
earned if the company does not meet the threshold for
the factor, 50% earned if the company meets the
threshold, 100% earned if the company achieves the
target, and 200% earned if the company achieves the

J&J 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 16, at 32–33.
Id. at 41.
329 Id. at 46.
330 Id. at 55.
331 Id. at 42, 51.
332 Id. at 42. Both “operational sales” and “adjusted operational eps”
are non-GAAP measures that apparently exclude the effects of currency
fluctuations. Id. at 33.
333 Id. at 45 (excluding from the count the duplicate listings for
GlaxoSmithKline plc and Merck & Co., Inc.).
334 Id. at 51.
327
328
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Johnson & Johnson
Performance
shares &
metrics
(continued)

maximum goal (with straight-line scaling between the
threshold and target and the target and maximum).335

Restricted
stock

All RSUs for any given award vest at the end of a
three-year vesting period.336

Executive is always in three vesting cycles.

Executive is always in three vesting cycles.
Compensation
in equity

55%337

JP Morgan Chase & Co.
Options

No options were awarded to CEO for 2014 or 2013338
but were awarded in prior years.339
No options were awarded to any of the NEOs in
2014.340
Options granted to CEO in 2010–12 and to other NEOs
in 2013 vested over a five-year period, in five equal
installments.341
Exercise period cannot exceed 10 years after grant.342

Annual cash
incentives

While the company paid incentive cash and RSUs to
the CEO in 2014, all of that compensation was
determined in the following manner:
Compensation & Management Development Committee

Id. at 52–53.
Id. at 43.
337 Id. at 54 (computed as reported value of stock awards plus option
awards, divided by reported total value of compensation).
338 JPM 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 20, at 58.
339 Id. at 60.
340 Id. at 60–61.
341 Id. at 60–61 and tbl. n.1c.
342 Id. at 80 (summary of amended plan), 112 (¶ 7(c) of JPM LongTerm Incentive Plan, as amended and restated effective May 19, 2015)).
The 10-year limitation is not among the changes listed on page 75,
indicating that the limitation was in the plan when it was last approved
by the shareholders in 2011.
335
336
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JP Morgan Chase & Co.
Annual cash
incentives
(continued)

(“CMDC”) set the CEO variable compensation and how
it would be divided between cash and equity.343 In
doing so, the CMDC did not use a formula344 but
considered
• Performance
• Value of the position to the organization and
shareholders over time
• Setting an example for others by doing “what’s
right” and strengthening company culture
• Market data
• Internal pay equity among the Operating
Committee members345
Performance was evaluated in four broad categories:
1. Business and financial results (e.g., net income,
increase in tangible book value, return on tangible
common equity, increase in Basel III Tier 1 capital
ratio)
2. Risk and control outcomes (e.g., increase in
spending on regulatory and control issues)
3. Client and customer goals (e.g., investment banking
operation “participated in nine of the top ten feepaying transactions”), and
4. People management and leadership objectives (e.g.,
work with board and CMDC on succession
planning)346
over an unspecified multi-year period347 with the
assessment
not
formulaic348
but
“holistic,”349
“balanced,”350 “disciplined,”351 and “rigorous.”352

Id. at 50.
Id. at 39.
345 Id. at 38–39.
346 Id. at 38, 42 (taking examples from report of CEO’s 2014
performance).
347 Id. at 38.
348 Id. at 39.
349 Id. at 38–39.
350 Id.
351 Id.
352 Id.
343
344
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JP Morgan Chase & Co.
Annual cash
incentives
(continued)

The CMDC had complete discretion to apply business
judgment in deciding appropriate compensation.353

Performance
shares &
metrics

No performance shares granted.

Restricted
stock

Amount paid in RSUs determined as set out in the
annual bonus column.
RSUs vest over three years, with one half vesting after
year two and one half after year three.354
But the vesting is subject to conditions, including a
minimum 15% cumulative return on tangible common
equity,355 which “measures the Firm’s earnings as a
percentage of average [tangible common equity],” which
is “the Firm’s common stockholders’ equity (i.e., total
stockholders’ equity less preferred stock) less goodwill
and identifiable intangible assets (other than
[mortgage servicing rights]), net of related deferred tax
liabilities.”356
Thus, assuming an award every year, an executive is
always in three vesting cycles after two years of
awards.

Compensation
in equity

55.5%357

Id. at 39.
Id. at 50.
355 Id.
356 Id. at 109.
357 Id. at 44, 49 (computed as stated value of RSUs divided by stated
value of total compensation). The table uses the figures on pages 44 and 49
instead of computing the percentage from the summary compensation
table because the equity figures in the summary compensation table
included some 2013 compensation due to the timing of awards. Id. at 58
n.5 to tbl.l.
353
354

